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Crowdfunding could be defined as a financing procedure of social projects and young 
enterprises based on contributions coming from a multitude of investors (the crowd) potentially 
spread worldwide.  
 
After a brief introductory section dealing with a general description of the crowdfunding 
phenomenon, it will be analysed more in detail the Italian regulatory framework: in particular, 
the exemptions from the common law and the transfer procedures of the shares issued through 
the equity crowdfunding platforms. Among the exemptions, in addition to the possibility of 
issuing participating units on specific online platforms, it is important mentioning the 
operations on own shares and the creation of classes of shares with different rights attached; 
moreover, the latter could also be devoid of voting rights. Those provisions, which represent a 
significant innovation for companies established as s.r.l., open interesting scenarios in terms of 
corporate governance: in this case, several studies have investigated about what shall be the 
most preferable choice regarding the voting rights delivery. Furthermore, it is important 
assessing also who shall be the most suitable subject in charge of exercising those rights. 
 
In analysing the classes of shares with voting rights attached and the transfer procedures in 
force according to the Italian regulatory framework, it will be established as a point of reference 
the British crowdfunding platform Seedrs; apart from appreciating the differences with the 
Italian provisions, the comparison is important in order to understand what are the possible 
improvements that the Italian Legislator could put in place in the next years.  
 
Lastly, concerning the future perspectives in terms of shares’ transfer procedures, it will be 














1. An alternative source of capital  
 
 
During the last decades, it emerged an innovative fundraising methodology, known as 
crowdfunding, which is based on the developments achieved in the Internet field. The 
neologism directly comes from the underlying principle of the methodology: indeed, it was 
interpreted in the literature as “the efforts by entrepreneurial individuals and groups – cultural, 
social, and for-profit – to fund their ventures by drawing on relatively small contributions from 
a relatively large number of individuals [the crowd] using the internet, without standard 
financial intermediaries”1. It implies that the crowdfunding phenomenon is not exclusively 
addressed to the business field: instead, it encompasses a wide range of initiatives, from artistic 
or humanitarian projects to high-growth entrepreneurial companies that seek capital on 
alternative financing channels. It was also defined as the "practice of funding a project or a 
venture by raising many small amounts of money from a large number of people, typically via 
the Internet”2. 
 
The following sections will analyse more in detail the impact of the Crowdfunding phenomenon 
on the business field: it represents “a valuable alternative source of funding for entrepreneurs 
seeking external financing”3 if compared to classic Venture Capitalists, Business Angels and 
bank financing. Indeed, it was observed that new ventures experienced significant difficulties 
(because of their intrinsic riskiness) in finding new capital from those sources during the first 
phases of their life, especially from the banking sector4. However, other authors sustained that 
crowdfunding could offer additional investment opportunities able to attract Venture Capitalists 
and Business Angels interested in diversifying their portfolio5.  
 
1 MOLLICK. The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study, Journal of Business Venturing, Volume 29, Issue 1, 
January 2014, p. 2. 
2 RIVON. Don’t let them fool ya: examining the SEC rules on Crowdfunding and their effect on small business growth, The 
Digital Journal of Rutgers School of Law (October 12, 2016), p. 32. 
3 BELLEFLAMME, LAMBERT, SCHWIENBACHER. Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right Crowd, Journal of Business 
Venturing, 29(5), 2014, p. 2.  
4 LEE, SAMEEN, COWLING. Access to finance for innovative SMEs since the financial crisis. Research Policy 44 (2), 2015, 
p. 370. 
5 WANG, MAHMOOD, SISMEIRO, VULKAN. The evolution of equity crowdfunding: Insights from co-investments of 
angels and the crowd, Research Policy, Elsevier, Vol. 48(8), 2019, p. 1. 
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In any case, crowdfunding represents an interesting raising-capital alternative aimed at 
supporting the growth of new entrepreneurial ideas, which would be directly financed by the 
public (the crowd) and not by the traditional financial institutions6.  Indeed, individuals could 
directly choose the companies or the projects in which investing through the Internet-based 
platforms. Moreover, it was observed that in such a context those individuals become “more 
closely involved in these firms, as active consumers, investors, or both” 7.  
 
One of the most innovative element of this fundraising procedure is that it is not required an 
active intermediary: as consequence, there will be a significant reduction in the intermediation 
costs that have to be sustained by the investors otherwise8. However, although the core business 
and the type of activity performed significantly differ from the traditional financial institutions, 
an intermediary still exists in the crowdfunding market, the platform itself: indeed, those entities 
“link fundraisers to funders with the aim of funding a particular campaign by typically many 
funders”9. Therefore, crowdfunding platforms simply facilitate the connection between the 
crowd and the fundraisers, without investing money on behalf of the former. Those entities 
were “heralded as a democratizing force in early stage finance”, even if the increasingly 
presence of Business Angels and Venture Capitalists alongside with the crowd could challenge 
this interpretation10.   
 
When a project or an enterprise asks for additional capital through a crowdfunding platform, it 
is usually been determined a certain collection target. If during the fundraising process the 
threshold is achieved, the crowdfunding campaign will be successfully closed. Only in some 
circumstances, the process will continue even after the achievement of the target 
(“overfunding”). However, if the threshold is not reached, the campaign will have a negative 
outcome: in this case, all the money eventually raised from the funders will be given back to 
them. The scheme was called “threshold pledge system”: it has the purpose of both defining a 
realistic money amount necessary to finance the project or the enterprise and safeguarding the 
potential funders11.   
 
6 SCHWIENBACHER, LARRALDE. Crowdfunding of Small Entrepreneurial Ventures, Handbook of Entrepreneurial 
Finance, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 4. 
7 BELLEFLAMME, LAMBERT, SCHWIENBACHER. Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right Crowd, Journal of Business 
Venturing, 29(5), 2014, p. 4. 
8 RIVON. Don’t let them fool ya: examining the SEC rules on Crowdfunding and their effect on small business growth, The 
Digital Journal of Rutgers School of Law (October 12, 2016), p. 32. 
9 SCHWIENBACHER, LARRALDE. Crowdfunding of Small Entrepreneurial Ventures, Handbook of Entrepreneurial 
Finance, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 4. 
10 WANG, MAHMOOD, SISMEIRO, VULKAN. The evolution of equity crowdfunding: Insights from co-investments of 
angels and the crowd, Research Policy, Elsevier, Vol. 48(8), 2019, p. 1. 
11 BELLEFLAMME, OMRANI, PEITZ. The Economics of Crowdfunding Platforms, 2015, p. 3. 
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Another element that shall be appraised is crowdfunding as marketing tool for young start-
ups12. Indeed, the fundraising campaign could arouse interest towards either the projects or the 
products/services that are going to be developed by the venture during the beginning phase of 
its growth path. In this case, crowdfunding could represent an interesting opportunity of 
advertising, since the start-up could divulge information not disclosable otherwise13. However, 
those eventual benefits are counterbalanced by potential costs: if the results of the crowdfunding 
campaign were not in line to what planned and forecasted, it would follow a serious damage 
from a reputational point of view14.    
 
 
2. Types of crowdfunding  
 
 
Other authors define crowdfunding as an “open call, essentially through the Internet, for the 
provision of financial resources either in form of donation or in exchange for some form of 
reward and/or voting rights in order to support initiatives for specific purposes”15. The 
principle behind the raising-capital procedure remains the same: it represents a model based on 
small contributions from small investors aimed at supporting the development of both projects 
and firms in which they believe. However, depending on what funders get in exchange for their 
investments on the platform, it is possible distinguishing among different categories of 
crowdfunding16. Indeed, the mentioned raising-capital procedure was interpreted in the 
literature as an umbrella under which positioning different kinds of fundraising methodologies 
arranged in order to achieve a certain objective or a particular purpose17. Among the types, 
donation-based, reward-based, lending, and equity crowdfunding are the most common 
categories18.   
 
12 SAYEDI, BAGHAIE. Crowdfunding as a Marketing Tool, 2017, pp. 189 and ff. 
13 WANG, MAHMOOD, SISMEIRO, VULKAN. The evolution of equity crowdfunding: Insights from co-investments of 
angels and the crowd, Research Policy, Elsevier, Vol. 48(8), 2019, pp. 1-2. 
14 BROWN, BOON, PITT. Seeking funding in order to sell: Crowdfunding as a marketing tool, Business Horizons, vol. 60, 
issue 2, 2017, p. 193.  
15 BELLEFLAMME, LAMBERT, SCHWIENBACHER. Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right Crowd, Journal of Business 
Venturing, 29(5), 2014, p. 8.  
16 PASCHEN. Choose wisely: Crowdfunding through the stages of the startup life cycle, Business Horizons, vol. 60, issue 2, 
2017, pp. 2 and ff.; POLICARO. Dalle s.r.l. emittenti sui portali online di equity crowdfunding alle s.r.l. aperte. «senza 
deviazione dalla norma, il progresso non è possibile», in La società a responsabilità limitata: un modello transtipico alla prova 
del Codice della Crisi, 2020, pp. 101-105.   
17 AHLERS, CUMMING, GUENTHER, SCHWEIZER. Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding, Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, 2015, p. 1. 
18 BELLEFLAMME, OMRANI, PEITZ. The Economics of Crowdfunding Platforms, 2015, pp. 4 and ff.; MEYSKENS, BIRD. 
Crowdfunding and Value Creation, Entrepreneurship Research Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2), 2015, p. 158; POLICARO. Dalle 
s.r.l. emittenti sui portali online di equity crowdfunding alle s.r.l. aperte. «senza deviazione dalla norma, il progresso non è 
possibile», in La società a responsabilità limitata: un modello transtipico alla prova del Codice della Crisi, 2020, pp. 101-105.  
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Donation-based crowdfunding is generally associated to either artistic or social projects: here, 
funders acquire the nature of “philanthropists”, since they do not expect any tangible or 
monetary return after the contribution made19. Moreover, it was observed that fundraising 
campaigns put in place by non-profit organizations for philanthropic goals have more odds to 
achieve the collection target compared to those arranged for profit purposes20. 
 
Concerning the reward-based type, funders generally obtain a tangible compensation in 
exchange for their capital injection21. It represents a category of crowdfunding particularly 
interesting in the business field, due to a high degree of versatility. Indeed, according to this 
raising-capital procedure, start-ups offer to potential funders prototypes of the products (or of 
the services) that the former are going to place on the market in the near future. In this case, the 
role of the funders is not only financing the firm, but also providing fundamental feedbacks 
about those products and services22. It means that small investors could significantly contribute 
to the development phase of those goods, providing suggestions directly to the founders: 
therefore, they have the role of prosumers23. Moreover, entrepreneurs could decide to grant to 
crowdfunders also finished products (or services) in presale or in limited edition. This choice 
produces advantages to both parties24: indeed, the latter could obtain finished products (or 
services) at an earlier date, at a better price or with special features; on the other hand, the start-
up could mitigate the development risk of new products (and services), understanding after the 
assessment of the fundraising campaign if an adequate demand exists or not. If the response 
was positive, the entrepreneurial idea would be validated by the market; if insufficient interest 
arose from the offering, the venture could “fail quickly”, without investing additional effort and 
capital25. Therefore, it represents a type of crowdfunding that cannot be assessed in monetary 
terms; indeed, funders get in exchange for the contributions made not a typical economic return 
but a tangible reward26.  
 
19 MEYSKENS, BIRD. Crowdfunding and Value Creation, Entrepreneurship Research Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2), 2015, 
p. 163; MOLLICK. The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study, Journal of Business Venturing, Volume 29, Issue 
1, January 2014, p. 3. 
20 SCHWIENBACHER, LARRALDE. Crowdfunding of Small Entrepreneurial Ventures, Handbook of Entrepreneurial 
Finance, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 10.  
21 MOLLICK. The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study, Journal of Business Venturing, Volume 29, Issue 1, 
January 2014, p. 3. 
22 SCHWIENBACHER, LARRALDE. Crowdfunding of Small Entrepreneurial Ventures, Handbook of Entrepreneurial 
Finance, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 13. 
23 BELLEFLAMME, OMRANI, PEITZ. The Economics of Crowdfunding Platforms, 2015, p. 6. 
24 MOLLICK. The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study, Journal of Business Venturing, Volume 29, Issue 1, 
January 2014, p. 3. 
25 MOLLICK. The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study, Journal of Business Venturing, Volume 29, Issue 1, 
January 2014, p. 3. 
26 SCHWIENBACHER, LARRALDE. Crowdfunding of Small Entrepreneurial Ventures, Handbook of Entrepreneurial 
Finance, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 7. 
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As anticipated before, the remaining two raising-capital models are known as lending-based 
and equity-based crowdfunding. Although they are characterized by significant differences, it 
is important underlying that in both cases the remuneration depends on the performance of the 
project or of the venture financed through the platform27.  
 
Regarding the lending-based model, it represents a comparable procedure with respect to that 
performed by traditional financial institutions, which rarely provide loans to young 
enterprises28. Differently from traditional loans, lending-based crowdfunding bypasses the 
banking intermediation logic: indeed, in the first case investment choices are totally left to 
potential crowdfunders. Furthermore, platforms usually do not realize any preliminary 
screening of the projects that are going to raise new capital through the portals29. According to 
this fundraising category, investors directly lend their money with the expectation of gaining a 
certain economic return, measured in terms of interest rate (usually fixed) computed on the 
investment realized30. Nevertheless, according to other authors, lenders may be more interested 
in the “social good promoted by the venture [rather] than any return generated by the loan”31.  
 
Lastly, the equity-based crowdfunding, whose regulatory framework in Italy will be analysed 
in the following chapters. According to this fundraising procedure, crowdfunders will get shares 
of the issuer company (becoming as consequence official members) in exchange for the 
contributions made32. Therefore, the objective of the funders is earning a certain economic 
return which could come from two different sources: i) shares of profits realized by the venture 
and distributed to the members after the assembly decision; ii) return on the initial investment, 
equal to the difference between the purchase price and the selling price of the shares acquired 
on the platform33. The latter could be gained selling the shares through private transactions or 




27 SCHWIENBACHER, LARRALDE. Crowdfunding of Small Entrepreneurial Ventures, Handbook of Entrepreneurial 
Finance, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 2. 
28 LEE, SAMEEN, COWLING. Access to finance for innovative SMEs since the financial crisis. Research Policy 44 (2), 2015, 
p. 370. 
29 SCHWIENBACHER, LARRALDE. Crowdfunding of Small Entrepreneurial Ventures, Handbook of Entrepreneurial 
Finance, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 5. 
30 SCHWIENBACHER, LARRALDE. Crowdfunding of Small Entrepreneurial Ventures, Handbook of Entrepreneurial 
Finance, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 5. 
31 MOLLICK. The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study, Journal of Business Venturing, Volume 29, Issue 1, 
January 2014, p. 3. 
32 BELLEFLAMME, OMRANI, PEITZ. The Economics of Crowdfunding Platforms, 2015, p. 4. 
33 FUTKO. Equity vs. Debt Crowdfunding – Crowdfund Insider, Accessed November 9, 2014. Available at: 
http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2014/09/50628-equity-vs-debt-crowdfunding/.  
34 SCHWIENBACHER, LARRALDE. Crowdfunding of Small Entrepreneurial Ventures, Handbook of Entrepreneurial 
Finance, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 18. 
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3. The crowdfunding process  
 
 
The crowdfunding process could be summarised according to Figure 135. The first two phases, 
the development of the campaign and the choice of the platform, are strongly related each other. 
Regarding the former, the venture has to quantify the monetary needs, assessing all the costs 
that shall be sustained during the development phase. Subsequently, the start-up has to choose 
the platform that is going to host the fundraising process: the choice is relevant, since it implies 
what crowdfunding type will be adopted by the venture and, as a consequence, the type of 
reward that will be delivered to the funders in exchange for the investments made on the 
platform.  
 
Figure 1: The crowdfunding process. MEYSKENS, BIRD (2015), p. 157. 
 
 
Furthermore, it was suggested by other authors that the choice of the fundraising platform 
depends on the stage of the life cycle in which the venture stands36. In particular, alongside with 
the growth path of the start-up, the most suitable crowdfunding platforms (in ascending order) 
are: i) donation-based; ii) reward-based; iii) lending-based; iv) equity-based. Therefore, it 
seems more advisable raising capital through crowdfunding platforms associated with the 
possibility to get a “pure” economic return from the investment only when the start-up has 
already overcome the early-stage phase of development.  
 
35 MEYSKENS, BIRD. Crowdfunding and Value Creation, Entrepreneurship Research Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2), 2015, 
p. 157. 
36 PASCHEN. Choose wisely: Crowdfunding through the stages of the startup life cycle, Business Horizons, vol. 60, issue 2, 






















Lastly, other scholars argued that the optimal choice of the platform relies on the combination 
between social value and economic value of the initiative that is going to be funded online 










             Figure 2: Choice of the platform. MEYSKENS, BIRD (2015), p. 163. 
 
 
The third phase consists in soliciting potential funders to invest their money: here crowdfunding 
platforms represent an important mean through which fundraisers could share media and 
provide updates about the ongoing projects38.  Moreover, the communication choices adopted 
by the ventures on the platform are quite important, since they significantly influence the 
chances of success of the fundraising campaigns themselves. Indeed, it was observed that 
disclosures of financial roadmaps (plans about the future activities that will be performed by 
the venture, also in terms of further financing rounds) and of the main risk factors related to the 
firm are associated with better odds of successfully completion of the offering39. Among the 
other factors that positively influence the conclusion of a campaign is important mentioning the 
experience of the Board of Directors, the number of the existing members, the quality of the 





37 MEYSKENS, BIRD. Crowdfunding and Value Creation, Entrepreneurship Research Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2), 2015, 
p. 163. Social value is assessed as the capacity of the venture to carry out initiatives that have a positive impact either on the 
environment or on the society in general. On the other hand, the economic value is related to the ability of the start-up to 
perform activities aimed at directly offering goods or services on the market or at supporting other enterprises in their value 
creation process.  
38 WANG, MAHMOOD, SISMEIRO, VULKAN. The evolution of equity crowdfunding: Insights from co-investments of 
angels and the crowd, Research Policy, Elsevier, Vol. 48(8), 2019, pp. 1-2. 
39 AHLERS, CUMMING, GUENTHER, SCHWEIZER. Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding, Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, 2015, p. 29. 
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However, regardless of the quality of the information about the venture provided on lending 
and equity crowdfunding platforms, it was observed that small investors often do not have 
adequate competences and skills in order to properly assess those investment opportunities40. 
As a consequence, there could arise issues in terms of information asymmetry. 
 
Lastly, the fourth and the fifth phases, which follow the closure of the fundraising campaign. 
Concerning the former, the money collected through the platform will be (presumably) invested 
by the ventures in their development projects. Moreover, issues in terms of information 
asymmetry could arise also during this phase, since investors could not properly control the 
way in which fundraisers use the money collected after the conclusion of the campaign41.  Some 
authors proposed as possible solutions against the information asymmetry either preliminary 
screening activities performed by the platform itself or the disclosure of additional and 
complementary information42. Regarding the fifth phase, it consists in the distribution to the 
funders of the promised rewards by the start-up. As a consequence, this last phase is not 
applicable to the donation-based crowdfunding model. Regarding the remaining three models 
already illustrated, the rewards are distributed to the backers only if the fundraising campaign 
is successfully concluded.  
 
 
4. First interventions of the Legislators  
 
 
The subsequent chapters will focus on the equity-based crowdfunding. The regulation of this 
kind of fundraising procedure was introduced for the first time by the U.S. Jumpstart Our 
Business Act (“JOBS Act”), which was emanated by the President Obama in 201243. It 
represents a set of rules that revolutionized the way in which young ventures could raise capital: 
indeed, they acquired the possibility to having access “to a big, new pool of potential investors 
– namely the American people”44. The section of the JOBS Act which regulates the equity-
crowdfunding phenomenon is the Title III, named as Capital Raising Online While Deterring 
Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act (“CROWDFUND Act”).  
 
40 AHLERS, CUMMING, GUENTHER, SCHWEIZER. Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding, Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, 2015, p. 1. 
41 BELLEFLAMME, OMRANI, PEITZ. The Economics of Crowdfunding Platforms, 2015, p. 24. 
42 BELLEFLAMME, OMRANI, PEITZ. The Economics of Crowdfunding Platforms, 2015, pp. 24 and ff. 
43 MEYSKENS, BIRD. Crowdfunding and Value Creation, Entrepreneurship Research Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2), 2015, 
p. 160. 
44 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/05/remarks-president-jobs-act-bill-signing in CAPELLI. L’equity 
based crowdfunding e i diritti del socio. V Convegno Annuale dell’associazione italiana dei professori universitari di diritto 
commerciale “Orizzonti del diritto commerciale”, 2014, p. 2.  
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The regulatory framework becomes effective in 2016, when SEC and Financial Industry 
Regulation allows online platforms to officially registering as such45. For the first time 
entrepreneurs and start-up could issue equity shares on specific crowdfunding platforms46. 
Lastly, the new regulatory framework does not overlap the rules related to the public offerings 
on regulated markets47. 
 
Alongside with those innovative rules, it is important underlying the prompt intervention of the 
Italian Legislator: Decreto Legge 179/2012 (which will be analysed more in detail in the 
following chapter) and the consequent introduction of Articles 50-quinquies and 100-ter of the 
TUF are the first European example of Regulation entirely devoted to the Crowdfunding 
phenomenon48. The former Article of the TUF regulates the activity performed by the portals’ 
managers; the latter concerns the raising-capital offerings that are arranged through the 
crowdfunding platforms. In other words, the framework represents a set of rules which regulates 
the most important aspects of the life cycle of a young venture49. After 2012, the rules were 
modified in order to enlarge the potential beneficiaries of the regulatory framework to a higher 
percentage of the overall Italian entrepreneurial system. Moreover, those provisions were 
integrated by the CONSOB Regulation n. 18592 of 2013.  
 
Although both of them aimed at regulating the same phenomenon, important differences 
between the U.S. and the Italian regulatory frameworks have to be mentioned50. The former is 
characterized by a more general nature, since there are no limitations related to the type of 
society of the beneficiaries. Indeed, in U.S. the equity crowdfunding is prohibited only to 
financial institutions and companies already quoted on regulated markets. In other words, the 
Italian regulatory framework does not allow all the emerging growth companies to take benefit 
from the innovative raising-capital procedure51. Nevertheless, more strict requirements are 
established by the JOBS Act in terms of capital amount that could be raised through the platform 
and overall number of funders allowed52.  
 
45 RIVON. Don’t let them fool ya: examining the SEC rules on Crowdfunding and their effect on small business growth, The 
Digital Journal of Rutgers School of Law (October 12, 2016), p. 29. 
46 STEMLER. The JOBS Act and crowdfunding: Harnessing the power—and money—of the masses, Business Horizons, 56(3), 
2013, p. 271.  
47 ALVISI. Equity crowdfunding: uno sguardo comparatistico, Rivista di diritto bancario, n. 3, 2014, p. 9. 
48 CAPELLI. L’equity based crowdfunding e i diritti del socio. V Convegno Annuale dell’associazione italiana dei professori 
universitari di diritto commerciale “Orizzonti del diritto commerciale”, 2014, p. 2; POLICARO. Dalle s.r.l. emittenti sui portali 
online di equity crowdfunding alle s.r.l. aperte. «senza deviazione dalla norma, il progresso non è possibile», in La società a 
responsabilità limitata: un modello transtipico alla prova del Codice della Crisi, 2020, p. 105.  
49 BENAZZO. La s.r.l. start-up innovativa, Le Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate, Vol. 37, Fasc. 1, 2014, p. 101. 
50 ALVISI. Equity crowdfunding: uno sguardo comparatistico, Rivista di diritto bancario, n. 3, 2014, p. 9. 
51 GUACCERO. La start-up innovativa in forma di società a responsabilità limitata: raccolta di capitale di rischio ed equity 
crowdfunding, Banca borsa e titoli di credito, Vol. 67, Fasc. 6, 2014, p. 702. 
52 Title III of JOBS Act states that fundraisers could collect through equity crowdfunding platforms a maximum of $1 million 
in a one year time period and from a maximum amount of 2000 investors. Each of them could invest through those platforms 
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The regulatory framework introduced by the Italian Legislator concerns only the equity-based 
crowdfunding: regarding the other types, there are not specific regulatory interventions of such 
importance and relevance. However, it is important underlying that, concerning lending-based 
crowdfunding, in 2016 there were introduced rules that regulate the collection of money from 
subjects different from the traditional financial institutions. In particular, Delibera n. 586 
emanated by the Bank of Italy named this kind of crowdfunding as “social lending”. It 
represents an “instrument through which a plurality of fundraisers could require reimbursable 





a maximum of $2000 per year or 5% of their income if lower than $100.000 or less than 10% of their income if higher than 
$100.000.  








1. Introduction  
 
 
1.1 Overview  
 
 
Section IX of “Decreto Legge 179/2012” (known as Decreto Crescita bis and converted with 
modifications by Legge n. 221/2012), Measures for the development of innovative start-up 
enterprises, represents a new set of provisions recently introduced by the Italian Legislator; it 
creates a favourable ecosystem for the growth of those enterprises that perform activities of 
development, production, and commercialization of products and services characterized by a 
high level of technological innovation54. The provisions introduced have the purpose of 
promoting the development of a new entrepreneurial culture in Italy, creating an economic 
system more favourable towards the innovation55. In a country severely hit by the financial 
crisis, innovative enterprises were thus considered as an important element able to positively 
stimulate the overall economy.  
 
Initially, provisions included in Section IX were addressed only to innovative start-ups (“start-
up innovative”), a temporary and extraordinary organizational model regulated by Article 25 of 
D.L. 179/2012. An innovative start-up can be established as a limited liability company (s.r.l. 
and s.p.a. in the Italian Corporate Law), cooperative society or Societas Europaea. The only 
type of society excluded from the provisions included in Section IX is the partnership (s.n.c. 
and s.a.s. in the Italian Corporate Law), which remains out of the recent interventions of the 
Legislator56. The rules introduced in 2012 concerns the introduction of a series of exemptions 
from the common law that facilitate the initial development and the raising-capital process of 




54 BENAZZO, La s.r.l. start-up innovativa, Le Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate, Vol. 37, Fasc. 1, 2014, p. 111. 
55 Accompanying report to D.L. 179/2012.  




Moreover, new entities were introduced and regulated for the first time: incubators of 
innovative start-ups (which shall be established as limited liability companies, cooperative 
societies or Societas Europaea) and portal managers, which play a key role in the raising-
capital process of innovative start-ups through the equity-crowdfunding platforms.  
 
The success of the innovative start-up model led the Legislator to extend part of the exemptions 
included in Section IX also to “innovative SMEs” (“PMI innovative”). Indeed, it was emanated 
Decreto Legge 3/2015 (converted by Legge n. 33/2015), which allows those firms to benefit 
from most of the provisions initially addressed only to innovative start-ups. It appears evident 
that the purpose of the Legislator was to open the beneficiaries of the favourable framework 
and to incentive even more new investments into innovative technologies.  To acquire the status 
of SME, the firm shall be compliant with the provisions included into the EC Recommendation 
2003/361, according to which the company shall not have more than 250 employees and at least 
one of the following thresholds has to be satisfied: i) total revenues lower than €50 Million; ii) 
total assets lower than €43 Million. Moreover, the enterprise could have as object whatever 
economic activity and shall not be part of groups of firms whose economic power overtakes 
that of a SME.   
 
After 4 years, the Legislator emanated Decreto Legge 50/2017 (converted by Legge n. 96/2017), 
which extends the favourable framework to every SME, regardless of the innovative feature of 
the activity performed. In particular, Article 57 (Subsection 1) of the mentioned Decreto states 
that the words “start-up(s) innovative(e)” will be substituted by the acronym “PMI” in Article 
26 (Subsections 2, 5 and 6) of D.L. 179/2012. As observed by a scholar, D.L. 50/2017 marks 
the transition “from a special right for innovative enterprises towards a special right also for 
conservative enterprises”57. In other words, the favourable framework defined in Section IX 
losses its connection with the innovative feature of the activity performed by the enterprise and 
remains linked simply to the dimensional characteristics of the firm. Overall, the framework 
created by the Legislator over the last 8 years highlights the willingness not only to facilitate 
the constitutions of new firms; but also the aim of supporting also the economic activity of the 
existing ones, allowing them to benefit from the provisions originally reserved only to start-ups 
and innovative enterprises.   
 
 







According to Article 32 (Subsection 7) of D.L. 179/2012, the Ministry of the Economic 
Development shall arrange a relation concerning the effectiveness of the incentive policies 
included in Section IX. In particular, the Ministry shall illustrate the impact of those policies 
on both economic growth and employment level; then, it will be expressed an assessment 
concerning the overall benefit of the provisions for the entire economic system and taking into 
consideration also the costs that have to be sustained to implement them. The last available 
relation was published in 2017 (data of 30th June 2017) and it shows interesting information 
related to the enterprises that could benefit from the favourable framework arranged by the 
Legislator.  
 
In particular, according to the Relation, innovative start-ups were equal to 7.398, with a 24,5% 
increase compared to 2016 Data and 93,7% of them was established as s.r.l.; the remaining 
enterprises were established as s.p.a. or as cooperative societies. Furthermore, innovative SMEs 
were equal to 565: 452 established as s.r.l. and 105 as s.p.a.. As suggested by a scholar, the 
higher percentage of the latter could be explained by the fact that it regards enterprises already 
established as s.p.a. before 2015 which acquire the status of innovative SME only after D.L. 
3/201558.   
 
More recent data concerning the beneficiaries of the favourable framework could be obtained 
by analysing the dataset provided by the website http://pminnovative.registroimprese.it, which 
discloses a regularly updated list of Italian innovative start-ups and SMEs. Data of October 
2020 shows that in Italy there are 11.972 innovative start-ups and 1.716 innovative SMEs (of 
which, respectively, 11.755 and 1.409 established as s.r.l.). Lastly, since SMEs represent most 
of Italian companies established as s.r.l., it becomes evident the interest of the Legislator 
towards this last type of society; indeed, the new provisions provide them interesting 
development opportunities59.  
 
 
58 CERRATO. La parabola di start-up e PMI dalla s.r.l. alla S.p.A., in La società a responsabilità limitata: un modello transtipico 
alla prova del Codice della Crisi, 2020, pp. 44-45. 
59  POLICARO. Dalle s.r.l. emittenti sui portali online di equity crowdfunding alle s.r.l. aperte. «senza deviazione dalla norma, 
il progresso non è possibile», in La società a responsabilità limitata: un modello transtipico alla prova del Codice della Crisi, 
2020, p. 110; SANTORO. Tentativi di sviluppo di un mercato secondario delle quote di società a responsabilità limitata, in La 
società a responsabilità limitata: un modello transtipico alla prova del Codice della Crisi, 2020, p. 280.    
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1.3 Influence on the s.r.l. type  
 
 
Despite the innovative nature of Section IX, the new provisions do not introduce an additional 
type of society; instead, they define an evolution of the s.r.l. type itself60. Until 2015, the 
interventions by the Legislator were initially considered of “marginal impact” with regards to 
the type of society. Indeed, the special exemptions recognized to start-ups and SMEs were 
strongly linked to the innovative feature of the activities performed, creating a narrow group of 
potential beneficiaries. Thus, given the strict requirements and the limited field of application 
of the provisions, innovative enterprises established as s.r.l. could be considered as coherent 
with this type of society. Moreover, the provisions introduced by the Legislator could be 
interpreted as a temporary framework for innovative start-ups: temporary because those 
enterprises would be subjected to the ordinary rules after a certain time period. However, after 
the extension of those provisions to every SME, regardless of the innovative feature of the 
activity performed (D.L. 50/2017 and D. Lgs. 129/2017), the vision of “marginal impact” of the 
Legislator interventions on the s.r.l. type became no more sustainable.   
 
Indeed, according to some authors, those interventions led to a radical change in the s.r.l. type, 
which breaks up into two sub-categories: SMEs established as s.r.l. (compliant with the EC 
Recommendation) and ordinary s.r.l. companies61. Regarding the latter, significant differences 
with the s.p.a. type remain, while, concerning the former, discrepancies tend to shrink. 
Moreover, concerning s.r.l. SMEs, uncertainty arises about the possibility to apply in analogy 
some s.p.a. rules, given the approaching between the two types of society (the topic will be 
analysed in the following paragraphs)62. Also, other authors states that the intervention of the 
Legislator does not lead to the creation of a new type of s.r.l. society63: this last interpretation 
was sustained by other scholars, which state that the open s.r.l. SME has to be considered as a 
“small-medium limited liability company with stocks”64.  
 
60 MALTONI, SPADA. L’impresa start up innovativa costituita in società a responsabilità limitata, Rivista del Notariato, Fasc. 
5, 2013, p. 1120. 
61 DESANA. PMI innovative, PMI e società a responsabilità limitata: una rivoluzione copernicana?, in La società a 
responsabilità limitata: un modello transtipico alla prova del Codice della Crisi, 2020, p. 70; CIAN. S.r.l. PMI, s.r.l., S.p.A.: 
schemi argomentativi per una ricostruzione del sistema, Rivista delle Società, Vol. 63, Fasc. 4, 2018, p. 819. NOTARI. Analisi 
de iure condendo delle 'varianti organizzative' delle s.r.l. (start up innovative, PMI innovative e PMI): problemi aperti e 
prospettive evolutive, Osservatorio del diritto civile e commerciale, Fasc. 2, 2019, p. 246. In particular, the latter distinguishes 
among s.r.l. innovative start-ups, s.r.l. innovative SMEs, s.r.l. SMEs and ordinary s.r.l. companies according to three 
dimensions: time, activity performed and dimension.   
62 CORSO. S.r.l.-PMI aperte al mercato: scelte statutarie e diritti dei soci investitori, Banca Borsa e Titoli di Credito, Vol. 72, 
Fasc. 6, 2019, p. 885. 
63 MALTONI, SPADA. L’impresa start up innovativa costituita in società a responsabilità limitata, Rivista del Notariato, Fasc. 
5, 2013, p. 1120. 




As observed by the doctrine, after the introduction and the extension of Decreto Crescita bis, 
“s.r.l.” would become a type of society “competitively advantaged” if compared to the s.p.a. 
type65. In other words, those provisions tend to create a competitive unbalance towards the s.r.l. 
type, which seems to become the preferred organizational model for new companies, even 
though s.p.a. type should be theoretically more suitable to attract new investments.  
 
The competitive advantage of the s.r.l. type has become significant since enterprises which 
benefit from the favourable framework could integrate features typical of the s.p.a. type to 
elements which characterize the ordinary s.r.l. type. For example, SMEs established as s.r.l. 
could maintain a corporate structure which gives relevance to some members (such as the 
founders) with respect to the others. In other words, it is lawful shaping it also asymmetrically 
compared to the capital injected by the members; moreover, differently from companies 
established as s.p.a., they do not need to elect an internal supervisory body, which represents a 
minimal safeguarding measure imposed on the firms that raise capital on the market.  
 
 
2 Access to the favourable framework  
 
 
2.1 Requirements  
 
 
The possibility to benefit from the favourable framework, which consists of several exemptions 
from the common law, is subordinated to the satisfaction and to the maintenance of several 
requirements by the companies. Innovative start-ups can benefit from the framework defined 
in Section IX only if two conditions are jointly satisfied: the compliance with the requirements 
stated in Article 25, Subsection 2, and the inclusion into the Special Section of the Business 
Registrar, as established by Article 25, Subsection 866.  
 
The requirements included in Article 25 (Subsection 2) of D.L. 179/2012 are related to the 
economic nature of the company, to the corporate institutional structure and to the remuneration 
policy of the investment.  
 
65 BENAZZO, La s.r.l. start-up innovativa, Le Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate, Vol. 37, Fasc. 1, 2014, p. 123. 




Some of them could be easily verified: in particular, the society i) shall not have shares quoted 
on a regulated market67; ii) shall be constituted from no more than 48 months (limit then 
extended to 60 months); iii) shall not be constituted after mergers or spin-offs; iv) shall have its 
headquarter in Italy.  
 
However, Article 25 (Subsection 2) establishes also other requirements more difficult to verify, 
because related to the future economic activity of the company: in this sense, the value of the 
total annual production lower than €5 million (from the second year of activity of the innovative 
start-up) and the prohibition of profit distribution in the subsequent 5 years of activity. Another 
requirement characterized by a significant level of uncertainty is related to the corporate 
purpose of the venture, that shall consist exclusively or mainly in the development, production 
and commercialization of innovative products or services with a high technological value. 
Doubts arise because the Legislator does not explain clearly in which circumstances a product 
or a service could be associated with the “high technological value” feature68. Indeed, it was 
observed that statements included in Section IX are not linked to any legal definition69.  Lastly, 
it is important mentioning that, after D.L. 83/2014, the status of innovative start-up was 
extended also to those companies that have as corporate purpose “the promotion of the national 
touristic offering”70. 
 
Furthermore, the innovative start-up must be compliant with at least one of these three 
requirements: 
 
i. Research and Development expenses shall be higher than the 15% of the maximum 
between production cost and total production value, as resulting from the balance sheet 
or, if not available, from an auto-certification provided by the legal representative of the 
firm. Considering that the innovative start-up will maintain its status for a limited 
duration (maximum 5 years), it is not clear whether, in order to get access to the 
exemptions for the entire period, that percentage shall be fulfilled in every year in which 
 
67 Indeed, as stated by DE LUCA (Crowdfunding e quote 'dematerializzate' di s.r.l.? prime considerazioni (art. 100 ter, commi 
2. Quinquies, Le Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate, Vol. 39, Fasc. 1, 2016, p. 1), equity-based crowdfunding represents a raising 
capital procedure that does not imply the creation of a trading platform able to facilitate the subsequent divestment of the shares 
purchased by the investors.  
68 BENAZZO, La s.r.l. start-up innovativa, Le Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate, Vol. 37, Fasc. 1, 2014, p. 113. 
69 GUIZZARDI.  L'impresa startup innovativa costituita in forma di s.r.l., Giurisprudenza Commerciale, Vol. 43, Fasc. 4, 2016, 
p. 557. 
70 Article 11-bis, D.L. 83/2014. 
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the firm wants to take advantage of the favourable framework or it is sufficient the 
compliance only in the first year71;     
ii. at least 1/3 of the total workforce shall be constituted by employees with verified 
academic education or with research experience in public or private research institutions 
of at least three years. The Legislator does not require any linkage between the education 
level of the employees and the activities realized by them inside the enterprise72, giving 
more relevance to the education level rather than to the real skills acquired by the 
employees during prior and eventual work experience; 
iii. the enterprise shall be owner or licensee of at least one industrial property right that 
shall be directly linked to the corporate purpose or to the activity performed by the 
company73.  
 
Section IX stated also that the majority of the shares (and of the voting rights) must be detained 
by natural persons, but the requirement was abolished in 2013. The suppression of this 
requirement allows to define clearer boundaries for the application of the rules, and it seems to 
signal the willingness of the Legislator to enlarge the number of companies that could get access 
to the favourable framework. Moreover, it was observed that Section IX does not establish as 
requirement any minimum level of initial capitalization that has to be fulfilled by the potential 
beneficiaries74.  
 
As mentioned before, the provisions were extended to innovative SMEs after the emanation of 
D.L. 3/2015. First of all, those enterprises shall be compliant with the thresholds established by 
the EC Recommendation 2003/361. In this case, the dimensional requirements in terms of total 
revenues are less strict with respect to what required for innovative start-ups, whose value of 
the annual production shall not exceed 5€ Million. Moreover, as reported by Article 4 of D.L. 
3/2015, the firm, that could be established either as a limited liabilities company or as a 
cooperative society, shall be located in Italy, shall not have shares quoted on regulated markets 





71 GUIZZARDI.  L'impresa startup innovativa costituita in forma di s.r.l., Giurisprudenza Commerciale, Vol. 43, Fasc. 4, 2016, 
p. 559. 
72 GUIZZARDI.  L'impresa startup innovativa costituita in forma di s.r.l., Giurisprudenza Commerciale, Vol. 43, Fasc. 4, 2016, 
p. 559. 
73 GUIZZARDI.  L'impresa startup innovativa costituita in forma di s.r.l., Giurisprudenza Commerciale, Vol. 43, Fasc. 4, 2016, 
p. 560. 
74 BENAZZO, La s.r.l. start-up innovativa, Le Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate, Vol. 37, Fasc. 1, 2014, p. 108. 
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Regarding the compliance with the “innovative” feature, innovative SMEs have to satisfy two 
of the following requirements: i) research and development expenses at least equal to 3% of the 
maximum between total production cost and total production value; ii) at least 1/5 of the total 
workforce shall be constituted by PhDs or PhDs students; iii) the enterprise shall be owner or 
licensee of at least one industrial property right.  
 
Furthermore, D.L. 3/2015 does not require for innovative SMEs a corporate purpose in line to 
what innovative start-ups have to comply with, removing a significant source of uncertainty 
related to its formulation. The extension has a significant impact also on the beneficiaries of the 
previous intervention, the innovative start-ups: indeed, those companies, which, according to 
D.L. 179/2012, could benefit from the exemptions included in Section IX only within 60 months 
from the foundation, could continue to be part of the favourable framework also after this time 
period, shifting their status to innovative SMEs. Obviously, the status transition could be 
performed only if all the pertaining requirements are correctly fulfilled. In other words, the 
status of innovative SME embeds all the Italian small and medium enterprises which operate in 
the field of technological innovation, regardless of the foundation date and of the corporate 
purpose.  
 
After the emanation of D.L. 50/2017, the regulatory framework was extended to every SME 
established as s.r.l., regardless of the innovative feature of the activity performed. Concerning 
those enterprises, the only relevant requirements remain those included in EC Recommendation 
2003/361. After those modifications, CONSOB has adjusted the Regulation n.18592 through 
Delibera n. 20204 of 29th November 2017.  
 
 
2.2 Special Section of the Business Registrar 
 
 
Article 25 (Subsection 8) of D.L. 179/2012 states that innovative start-ups (and also incubators) 
could benefit from the favourable framework if included into the Special Section of the 
Business Registrar, kept by the Chambers of Commerce. The enterprise shall arrange an 
admission demand in electronic format which includes: i) date and place of foundation; ii) name 
and address of the notary; iii) address of the headquarter; iv) corporate purpose; v) a brief 
description of the activity performed; vi) list of the members; vii) list of eventual investee 
companies; viii) information related to the academic path and to the previous professional 
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experience of the members, excluding sensitive information; ix) information related to 
relationships with incubators or qualified investors; x) most recent financial statements; xi) list 
of registered patents.  
 
Also, the inclusion into the Special Section requires the submission of an auto-certification 
(arranged by the legal representative of the firm itself) attesting the compliance of the company 
with the established requirements. Doubts related to the provision have emerged since some 
scholars observed that legal representatives need not to satisfy any condition in terms of 
professionalism and independence75.  
 
Even innovative SMEs have to be included into a dedicated section of the Business Registrar 
and, as for innovative start-ups, they have to submit an auto-certification attesting the 
compliance with the legal requirements. Among the requirements, innovative SMEs shall not 
be already part of the Special Section of the Business Registrar related to the innovative start-
ups. Further to this point, an important element that deserves to be analysed is the transition 
from innovative start-up towards innovative SME. Innovative start-ups which become unable 
to satisfy at least one of the requirements established by D.L. 179/2012 (for example, when 5 
years from the foundation pass, when the total production value exceeds €5 Million or when 
the enterprises decide to distribute profits) could shift their status to innovative SME without 
any interruption if the pertaining requirements are satisfied. In particular, the enterprise shall 
request the cancellation from the start-up section and, contextually, shall request the inscription 
in the Special Section of the Business Registrar related to the innovative SMEs. In other words, 
it is allowed the maintenance of the benefits legally compatible with the new status. 
 
 
2.3 Temporary nature of the favourable framework  
 
 
Initially, the favourable framework established by the Legislator had the purpose of creating a 
system able to support small firms only during their initial phase of development, without 
maintaining permanently its effectiveness over the life of such enterprises76.  
 
75 GUIZZARDI.  L'impresa startup innovativa costituita in forma di s.r.l., Giurisprudenza Commerciale, Vol. 43, Fasc. 4, 2016, 
p. 561. 




Indeed, a company would have lost the status of innovative start-up not only when it had failed 
to be compliant with at least one of the requirements established by Article 25, but also after 48 
months (subsequently extended to 60) from the foundation date. Those circumstances were not 
self-sufficient, because should be followed by the cancellation from the Special Section of the 
Business Registrar within sixty days by their occurrence77. Thus, the exemptions from the 
common law included in Section IX seemed to be counterbalanced by the temporary nature of 
the framework.  
 
Nevertheless, even if the enterprise had lost its status of innovative start-up, some clauses 
included in the corporate bylaws according to Article 26 (in particular, Subsections 2, 3 and 7) 
would have maintained their effectiveness on the shares already subscribed also after the 
cancellation from the Special Section of the Business Registrar78. Indeed, it is true that the status 
will be lost by the company in any case after five years from the foundation; however, the 
provisions concerning the corporate law could not have a temporary nature, maintaining their 
effectiveness on the participating shares already issued79. In other words, after that the initial 
development phase is completed, there will remain a company excluded from the Special 
Section and subject to the traditional rules that will keep in its capital structure or inside its 
corporate bylaws significant and relevant “traces” of the favourable framework. The 
exemptions from which the enterprises could benefit will be analysed more in detail in the 
following chapters.  
 
Furthermore, the two subsequent interventions of the Legislator (D.L. 3/2015 and D.L. 50/2017) 
seem leading towards a progressive dissolution of the temporary nature feature. Indeed, 
differently from innovative start-ups, the exemptions are recognized to innovative SMEs 
without any constraint in terms of duration: in particular, the time limit of 5 years within which 
the enterprises could benefit from the favourable framework was expressively abolished for 
innovative SMEs after the emanation of D.L. 3/2015. In other words, it was removed by the 
Legislator the most important feature concerning the temporary nature of the framework.  
 
Then, after D.L. 50/2017, the exemptions originally prescribed only for innovative start-ups 
were extended to every SME, regardless of the nature of the activity performed. Moreover, as 
for innovative SMEs, those provisions define a favourable framework that is not subject to any 
 
77 BENAZZO, La s.r.l. start-up innovativa, Le Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate, Vol. 37, Fasc. 1, 2014, p. 113.  
78 BENAZZO, La s.r.l. start-up innovativa, Le Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate, Vol. 37, Fasc. 1, 2014, p. 113. 
79 GUIZZARDI.  L'impresa startup innovativa costituita in forma di s.r.l., Giurisprudenza Commerciale, Vol. 43, Fasc. 4, 2016, 
p. 562.  
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temporal limit, in contrast with what established by the Legislator in D.L. 179/2012; indeed, 
according to latter the exemptions from the common law addressed to innovative start-ups had 
a temporary nature.  
 
 
2.4 Loss of the status 
 
 
As anticipated before, a firm could lose the status of innovative start-up or SME when the 
requirements previously mentioned cease to be satisfied. Moreover, an enterprise loses the 
status of SME when it fails to satisfy the dimensional thresholds included in the EC 
Recommendation 2003/361. In both cases, the loss of the status implies the inability to continue 
to benefit from the new regulatory framework introduced by the Legislator.  
 
It was discussed if the loss of the status of SME would lead to either a transformation of the 
society into s.p.a. or to legal invalidity of the type, due to the possible presence in the corporate 
bylaws of incoherent clauses with the s.r.l. type80. However, the former solution was considered 
as unfeasible, because it does not exist any legal provision that imposes a transformation of the 
type of society after the occurrence of certain events. Regarding the latter, it would mean that 
the presence inside the corporate bylaws of such clauses shall be considered as a cause of 
invalidity according to the Article 2332 of the Civil Code. It would derive that, in this last case, 
members have to modify the corporate bylaws in order to avoid the dissolution of the firm. 
However, it was observed that this interpretation would be considered as not in line with the 
purpose of the Legislator, which is to incentive the creation and the development of medium 
and small enterprises and not to create obstacles over their life81. Indeed, the duty of modifying 
the corporate bylaws after the overtaking of the SME dimensional thresholds would lead to a 
slowing down of the enterprise development. Therefore, if the loss of the status does not lead 
to the consequences illustrated before, it would derive that, after overtaking the dimensional 
thresholds, the enterprise will maintain in its corporate bylaws clauses that are not in 




80 BENAZZO. Categorie di quote, diritti di voto e governance della 'nuovissima' s.r.l., Rivista delle Società, Fasc. 5/6, 2018, 
pp. 1448-1449. 




As a consequence, on one side there will be companies established as “ordinary s.r.l.” and 
entirely compliant with the Civil Code; on the other, there will be firms, originally established 
as “s.r.l. SMEs” that, after overtaking the dimensional thresholds, will be subject to the 
provisions included in the Civil Code and, at the same time, will maintain in their corporate 
bylaws “traces” of the special exemptions included in the Decreto Crescita bis. Those 
exemptions will be subject to further analysis in the following paragraph. 
 
 
3 Exemptions from the common law 
 
 
As stated by Article 26 of D.L. 179/2012, the acquisition of the status “innovative start-up” 
allows those enterprises to benefit of exemptions from the corporate law rules established by 
the Civil Code for limited liabilities companies (s.p.a. and s.r.l.)82. Actually, the only provision 
of the Article devoted to both types of society concerns the lightening of the rules related to the 
shareholders’ equity (Article 26, Subsection 1): indeed, it is established a translation of the time 
limit within which proceeds with the capital reduction for losses higher than one third of the 
total capital83. In particular, the deadline is translated to the second subsequent year, in 
exemption from what established by Article 2446 and by Article 2482-bis of the Civil Code. 
Moreover, the provisions establish a further deadline within which taking the decisions pursuant 
to Articles 2447 and 2482-ter of the Civil Code: in this case, the deadline is shifted to the end 
of the subsequent year. Allowing the enterprise to continue its activity despite the operating 
losses, the exemption favours the interests of the members compared to those of the creditors, 
differently from what established by the common law84. Furthermore, the different way of 
managing the conflict of interest between members and creditors could be appreciated also from 
Article 31 of D.L. 179/2012. According to it, innovative start-ups (established either as s.r.l. or 
as s.p.a.) are excluded from bankruptcy procedures. The exemption could be justified by the 
limited duration of the innovative start-up status, equal to five years from the foundation of the 
company. The provision clearly supports those innovative enterprises only during their first 
phase of development; indeed, after the emanation of both D.L. 3/2015 and D.L. 50/2017, those 
exemptions were not extended neither to innovative SMEs nor to SMEs.  
 
 
82 Those exemptions will be analysed in detail in the following paragraphs.  
83 The possibility, originally addressed only to innovative start-ups, was extended to Innovative SMEs after D.L. 3/2015.  
84 CAPELLI. L’equity based crowdfunding e i diritti del socio. V Convegno Annuale dell’associazione italiana dei professori 
universitari di diritto commerciale “Orizzonti del diritto commerciale”, 2014, p. 7.  
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Regarding the remaining part of Article 26, the Legislator seems to have assessed the s.p.a. type 
as inadequate for the development of the innovative enterprises. Hence, the subsequent 
provisions define a framework applicable mostly to the s.r.l. type, which was considered by the 
Legislator as the most suitable type of society for the management of innovative enterprises at 
high technological value.  
 
After D.L. 3/2015 and D.L. 50/2017 those exemptions were extended first to innovative SMEs 
and then to every SME. Actually, the syntagm “innovative start-up” was substituted by the 
word “SME” in Subsections 2, 5 and 6 of the Article 26. Thus, the ratio of the recent rules was 
supporting all the SMEs with the purpose of reviving the entire Italian economy, severely 
damaged by the recent economic crisis. Those companies assume a strategic importance in the 
economic system since they employ about 82% of Italian workers and constitute the 92% of the 
total Italian firms85.  
 
 
3.1 Public offering 
 
 
3.1.1 Derogation from the Civil Code (Art. 2468) and TUF integrations  
 
 
Several elements included in Decreto Crescita bis mark a strong deviation from the traditional 
rules for limited liabilities companies. In particular, the possibility, initially granted to 
innovative start-ups (and extended first to innovative SMEs and then to every SME) established 
as s.r.l., to offer to the public their own membership shares also through online raising capital 
portals; the latter are managed by special entities, called portals managers, that shall be 
included in a specific registrar kept by the CONSOB. The provision is clearly contradictory 
with respect to what established by Article 2468 (Subsection 1) of the Civil Code; indeed, the 
Article states that membership shares cannot be represented by stocks and cannot be offered to 
the public. It derives that the capital raised by the company need not have a qualified (and 





86 BENAZZO, La s.r.l. start-up innovativa, Le Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate, Vol. 37, Fasc. 1, 2014, p. 120. 
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The provision, which is enabled by the recent developments in the digital communication 
systems, represents a significant innovation for two reasons: it is the first European regulatory 
framework addressed to the crowdfunding phenomenon87 and it makes open to the public a type 
of society with an inherently close nature (s.r.l.). Indeed, the Internet allows users to invest 
money in the entrepreneurial ideas in which they believe through the crowdfunding platforms. 
 
The new regulation, which was initially addressed only to innovative start-ups established as 
s.r.l, enlarges significantly the raising-capital opportunities for those firms, almost overlapping 
the features of the s.p.a. type. As introduced before, those provisions were characterized by a 
temporal limit: since companies could maintain the status of innovative start-up for maximum 
48 months after the foundation (subsequently extended to 60 months), it means that the 
possibility to raise capital through crowdfunding platforms expires after a limited period of 
time. After the deadline, the innovative start-up would have lost in any case its status and would 
be subject to the traditional s.r.l. rules in terms of capital raising. In 2015 the possibility to raise 
funds through crowdfunding platforms was extended also to innovative SMEs. It represents a 
relevant regulatory innovation because it removes for them the temporary nature of the special 
provisions. Moreover, after 5 years from the foundation, innovative start-ups could change their 
status to innovative SME (if compliant with the legal requirements) and could continue to 
benefit from the possibility to raise capital through crowdfunding platforms.  
 
The provisions related to the public offering were integrated by Art. 100-ter of the TUF 
(introduced with Decreto Crescita bis), according to which the capital raised through 
crowdfunding platforms shall be lower than €5 million88. The purpose is maintaining as simple 
as possible the crowdfunding raising-capital procedures, because exceeding the threshold will 
lead the enterprise to the duty of arranging an additional prospect, according to what established 
by Art. 93-bis and ff. of the TUF. The threshold was increased to €8 Million in 2018 in order 





87 CAPELLI. L’equity based crowdfunding e i diritti del socio. V Convegno Annuale dell’associazione italiana dei professori 
universitari di diritto commerciale “Orizzonti del diritto commerciale”, 2014, p. 2; POLICARO. Dalle s.r.l. emittenti sui portali 
online di equity crowdfunding alle s.r.l. aperte. «senza deviazione dalla norma, il progresso non è possibile», in La società a 
responsabilità limitata: un modello transtipico alla prova del Codice della Crisi, 2020, p. 105. 
88 GUACCERO. La start-up innovativa in forma di società a responsabilità limitata: raccolta di capitale di rischio ed equity 
crowdfunding, Banca borsa e titoli di credito, Vol. 67, Fasc. 6, 2014, pp. 703-704. 
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Moreover, the word “also” stated in the provision (“...offer to the public their own membership 
shares also through online raising-capital portals…”) implies that the enterprise can raise capital 
also through “traditional channels”89: those channels include banks and other authorized 
financial intermediaries90. In this case, it is important understanding what shall be the regulatory 
framework applicable when raising-capital offerings are arranged outside the crowdfunding 
platforms.  
 
In particular, several authors discussed about the qualification of s.r.l. shares as “securities” in 
compliance with the definition provided by the TUF, Article 1, Subsection 1-bis91.  Among the 
scholars, it was suggested that the s.r.l. share acquires the feature of “security” when a public 
offering to potentially unknown funders (“ad incertas persona”) occurs92. As a consequence, 
the raising-capital procedure could be realized either according to Article 93-bis (and 
subsequent) or to Article 100-ter of the TUF. In the first case, it will be required also an 
information sheet approved by the CONSOB, unless the offering is compliant with one of the 
exemption hypothesis established by Article 100 of the TUF93. Lastly, it was observed that the 
company could raise capital jointly both raising-capital portals and those traditional channels. 
In this case, only if the €5 Million threshold (subsequently extended to €8 Million) was 
overtaken, Article 93-bis and subsequent TUF would be applied94.  
 
Qualifying s.r.l. shares as “securities” could have relevant implications in terms of issuance: 
indeed, they could be quoted on channels such as the Italian Alternative Investment Market 
(“AIM”) or “Market for the SMEs development” (“Mercato per la crescita delle PMI”). The 
thesis was confirmed also by other scholars, according to which the current definitions of 
“financial instrument” and “security” established by Article 1 of the TUF could allow the 
inclusion of the s.r.l. shares inside the latter95: as a consequence those shares could be 
 
89 GUACCERO. La start-up innovativa in forma di società a responsabilità limitata: raccolta di capitale di rischio ed equity 
crowdfunding, Banca borsa e titoli di credito, Vol. 67, Fasc. 6, 2014, p. 707; GUIZZARDI. L'impresa startup innovativa 
costituita in forma di s.r.l., Giurisprudenza Commerciale, Vol. 43, Fasc. 4, 2016, pp. 571-573. 
90 GUACCERO. La start-up innovativa in forma di società a responsabilità limitata: raccolta di capitale di rischio ed equity 
crowdfunding, Banca borsa e titoli di credito, Vol. 67, Fasc. 6, 2014, p. 710. 
91 BENAZZO. La s.r.l. start-up innovativa, Le Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate, Vol. 37, Fasc. 1, 2014, p.119; SANTORO. 
Tentativi di sviluppo di un mercato secondario delle quote di società a responsabilità limitata, in La società a responsabilità 
limitata: un modello transtipico alla prova del Codice della Crisi, 2020, pp. 283-284; DENTAMARO. Apertura della s.r.l. PMI 
tra divieto di rappresentazione delle quote ex art. 2468, comma 1, c.c. e tutela dell’investitore, in La società a responsabilità 
limitata: un modello transtipico alla prova del Codice della Crisi, 2020, pp. 170-176. 
92 CUSA. Le quote di s.r.l. possono essere valori mobiliari, Rivista delle Società, Vol.64, Fasc. 4, 2019, p. 689. 
93 CUSA. Le quote di s.r.l. possono essere valori mobiliari, Rivista delle Società, Vol.64, Fasc. 4, 2019, p. 689; GUACCERO. 
La start-up innovativa in forma di società a responsabilità limitata: raccolta di capitale di rischio ed equity crowdfunding, Banca 
borsa e titoli di credito, Vol. 67, Fasc. 6, 2014, p. 709. 
94 GUACCERO. La start-up innovativa in forma di società a responsabilità limitata: raccolta di capitale di rischio ed equity 
crowdfunding, Banca borsa e titoli di credito, Vol. 67, Fasc. 6, 2014, pp. 710-711. 
95 CIAN. Dalla S.r.l. a base personalistica alle quote ''finanziarie'' e alla destinazione ai mercati: tante S.r.l.?, Studium Iuris, 
Vol. 24, Fasc. 12, 2019, p. 457. 
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theoretically quoted on this kind of regulated market. However, it was observed that any s.r.l. 
company was admitted to the AIM Market so far96.  
 
On the other hand, other authors, although asserting that s.r.l. shares could be compliant with 
the notion of “financial product”, reject the inclusion inside the category of “securities”97: as a 
consequence, they shall be included inside the notion of “other forms of financial investment”. 
Therefore, it is not clear if the word “also” adopted by the Legislator in Article 26 (Subsection 




3.1.2 The process 
 
 
The admission of shares offerings on crowdfunding platforms is subordinated to a check 
performed by the portal managers, according to what established by Articles 24 and 25 of the 
CONSOB Regulation n.18592 of 2013. They shall verify the existence in the corporates’ 
bylaws of tag-along rights or withdrawal’s rights exercisable by non-qualified investors in case 
the control investors would decide to transfer their membership shares (and the control of the 
entity) to third, non-qualified, parties. The need of attributing to crowdfunding investors these 
rights derives from the relevant and prominent role played by the founders: indeed, it is 
important reminding that the framework was initially addressed only to innovative start-ups, 
which are young enterprises with an economic profile not clearly defined yet. In such a context, 
the figure of the founder and its entrepreneurial idea could conditionate crowdfunding 
investment decisions much more compared to what can be done by the balance sheet or by the 
corporate bylaws. After the extension of the favourable framework also to potential mature 
companies, such as innovative SMEs and SMEs, the inclusion of tag-along rights or 
withdrawal’s rights inside the corporate bylaws remain compulsory since they represent 
significant safeguarding measures for the investors.  
 
96 CUSA. Le quote di s.r.l. possono essere valori mobiliari, Rivista delle Società, Vol.64, Fasc. 4, 2019, p. 677 (notes). 
97 DENTAMARO. Apertura della s.r.l. PMI tra divieto di rappresentazione delle quote ex art. 2468, comma 1, c.c. e tutela 




Regarding the conditions of the tag-along rights, the common orientation is attributing to 
minority investors the same selling conditions of the control investors: it assures to who invest 
through crowdfunding platforms to get the same economic return of the founders98.  
 
Withdrawals’ rights, as tag-along rights, have the purpose of avoiding that crowdfunding 
investors would suffer passively an eventual transfer of control. In this case, the challenge is 
determining the value at which the right could be exercised. Indeed, choosing as strike price the 
initial investment value is not a coherent choice, while the market value is difficult to assess. It 
derives that the enterprise shall indicate in the corporate bylaws criteria to determine the strike 
price, conditioning it on values from assets or liabilities of the balance sheet, as an example. 
The problem is the possible unfair determination of the exit value: indeed, it was observed that 
the Legislator does not provide appropriate guidelines related to the concrete content of such 
clauses included in the corporate bylaws99. It derives that crowdfunders could come up with 
clauses that, even if should have a safeguarding purpose, actually could damage them because 
of possible unfair conditions. Lastly, the website of the enterprise shall disclose every 
shareholder’s agreement already stipulated, as required by Article 24, Subsection 1, of the 
CONSOB Regulation n. 18592 of 2013100. 
 
Furthermore, portals managers have to verify if at least 5% of the financial instruments issued 
was acquired by qualified investors, banking foundations or start-up incubators101. After the 
modification of the CONSOB Regulation, the minimum percentage that has to be detained by 
those investors was lowered to 3%102. The duty of including a specific percentage of 
institutional investors inside the corporate structure aims at safeguarding the position of small 
crowdfunders. The lower percentage could be applied only if financial statements related to the 
previous two years have been certified by statutory auditors; otherwise, the threshold would 
remain equal to 5%. The purpose of the provision is indirectly safeguarding private 
crowdfunders, since the role of the qualified investors is to assure the reliability of the offering 
through a relevant investment.  
 
 
98 CAPELLI. L’equity based crowdfunding e i diritti del socio. V Convegno Annuale dell’associazione italiana dei professori 
universitari di diritto commerciale “Orizzonti del diritto commerciale”, 2014, p. 14. 
99 CAPELLI. L’equity based crowdfunding e i diritti del socio. V Convegno Annuale dell’associazione italiana dei professori 
universitari di diritto commerciale “Orizzonti del diritto commerciale”, 2014, p. 14. 
100 BENAZZO, La s.r.l. start-up innovativa, Le Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate, Vol. 37, Fasc. 1, 2014, p. 129; CAPELLI. 
L’equity based crowdfunding e i diritti del socio. V Convegno Annuale dell’associazione italiana dei professori universitari di 
diritto commerciale “Orizzonti del diritto commerciale”, 2014, p. 18. 
101 CONSOB Regulation n. 18592/2013, Article 24, Subsection 2. 
102 Delibera CONSOB n. 20204 of 29.11.2017. 
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Moreover, there exist also other measures which directly protect investors: for example, they 
can withdraw from purchase orders without additional expenses after a communication to the 
crowdfunding platform which shall be sent within seven days from the acquisition of the shares. 
The right just illustrated can be defined as a “regret right” (diritto di pentimento), which was 
interpreted by the doctrine as a way of counterbalancing the facility with which online orders 
could be performed on crowdfunding platforms103. Indeed, the purpose of the right is offering 
to crowdfunders an additional safeguarding measure which consists in a rapid exit way in a 
context that could encourage a reckless decision-making process. 
 
Another direct protection measure addressed to private investors consists in a “revocation right” 
(Article 25 of CONSOB Regulation) that could be exercised when, between the day of the share 
purchase and the moment in which the public offering is concluded, new facts or inaccuracies 
able to influence the investors' decisions and related to the information disclosed on the 
crowdfunding platform emerge104. The right could be exercised within seven days after that the 
new and updated information is known to the investors. After both regret rights and revocation 
rights are exercised, the entire money amount invested will return back to the funders. 
 
Lastly, the crowdfunding platform has to disclose to potential investors all the relevant 
information concerning the investment opportunities in a clear and synthetic way, allowing 
them to take conscious investment decisions105. This information shall regard, for example, the 
risks of losses and illiquidity of the crowdfunding investments and the identity of the members 
who detain the control. The latter is a key information in order to make exercisable the 
mentioned tag-along and withdrawal’s rights.  
 
 
3.1.3 S.r.l as public company and applicability of the s.p.a. regulatory framework 
 
 
In the past, the distinction between s.r.l. and s.p.a. types of society dealt with the contraposition 
between closed company (the former) and public company (the latter). However, after the 
intervention of the Legislator in 2017, every Small and Medium Enterprise established as s.r.l. 
 
103 CAPELLI. L’equity based crowdfunding e i diritti del socio. V Convegno Annuale dell’associazione italiana dei professori 
universitari di diritto commerciale “Orizzonti del diritto commerciale”, 2014, p. 12. 
104 CAPELLI. L’equity based crowdfunding e i diritti del socio. V Convegno Annuale dell’associazione italiana dei professori 
universitari di diritto commerciale “Orizzonti del diritto commerciale”, 2014, pp. 12-13. 
105 CAPELLI. L’equity based crowdfunding e i diritti del socio. V Convegno Annuale dell’associazione italiana dei professori 
universitari di diritto commerciale “Orizzonti del diritto commerciale”, 2014, p. 11. 
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could potentially be considered as “public company”. This conclusion could be achieved by 
reading what reported in Article 26 (Subsection 5) of D.L. 179/2012, according to which, as 
explained before, the s.r.l. SME can issue its membership shares on equity crowdfunding 
platforms.  
 
Even other elements confirm the interpretation: i) the formulation of Article 93-bis of the TUF, 
which includes in the definition of “public offerings” also those concerning “categories of 
values that could be negotiated on capital markets, such as corporate shares and equivalent 
instruments”; ii) the extension of the notion “transferable security” (“valore mobiliare”) to 
“categories of values that could be negotiated on capital markets, such as corporate shares and 
equivalent instruments”; iii) the introduction of a new transfer procedure system, called 
“intermediary registration” (“regime alternativo di intestazione della quota”), which will be 
analysed more in detail in the following chapter.  
 
Since the SME established as s.r.l. has to be considered as a potential public company, it is 
important analysing the influence that the s.p.a. regulatory framework could exercise on it. A 
first important point is the difference between SMEs established as s.r.l. potentially and 
effectively open. According to some authors, the recall of the s.p.a. rules (that could concern 
only the latter) shall consist into a different interpretation of the current s.r.l. provisions: in 
particular, there were suggested exclusions or limitations about the provisions that 
“characterized the s.r.l. as a closed type of society” 106. As a consequence, rules related to a 
different type of company would not be directly applicable by analogy on the s.r.l. type without 
a specific intervention of the Legislator.   
 
However, it was argued that s.p.a. rules could be applied by analogy in some circumstances: in 
this case, the possible reference to this framework (that could concern only the s.r.l. SMEs 
effectively open107) would occur extending by analogy the provisions originally addressed to 
the s.p.a. type. According to a scholar, the focus shall be on those provisions that have the 
purpose of assuring the efficiency and the transparency of the enterprise on the capital 
markets108. As a consequence, only those rules could be applied in analogy also by effectively 
open s.r.l. SMEs.  
 
106 POLICARO. Dalle s.r.l. emittenti sui portali online di equity crowdfunding alle s.r.l. aperte. «senza deviazione dalla norma, 
il progresso non è possibile», in La società a responsabilità limitata: un modello transtipico alla prova del Codice della Crisi, 
2020, pp. 120-121. 
107 Namely, the companies that have already issued their shares to the public or that have already taken benefits from the 
exemptions included in Article 26 of the Decreto. 




For example, since their shares are quoted (or are going to be quoted) on capital markets, it 
derives, according to this interpretation, that those enterprises cannot compose the balance sheet 
in abbreviate form (Article 2345-bis of the Civil Code)109; other authors, however, sustained 
the opposite thesis, according to which the prohibition shall not be applied on those firms110.  
 
Another important point is related to the statutory audit of the firm’s balance sheet.  This process 
is compulsory for every company established as s.p.a., while it becomes mandatory for s.r.l. 
companies only when the limits established by Article 2477 (Subsection 3) of the Civil Code 
are overtaken. Since the duty has the purpose of assuring the fairness of the accounting 
documents produced by the company, it derives that the financial statements of every SME 
effectively open shall be certified by statutory auditors, applying in analogy the relative s.p.a. 
rules111. However, it is important underlying that the audited financial statements are included 
among the requirements that have to be satisfied by a firm in order to acquire the status of 
innovative SME112: in other words, the Legislator explicitly requires the certification for those 
companies. As a consequence, claiming that every SME must own certified financial statements 
even if the Legislator does not require them explicitly could not be considered as a coherent 
choice; even if the purpose of the requirement would be increasing the transparency of the 
information disclosed on the equity crowdfunding market. 
 
Concerning the appointment of a supervisory body in s.r.l. SMEs, the framework included in 
Section IX does not provide any specific rule. Nevertheless, Article 2477 of the Civil Code 
establishes rules addressed to the “ordinary” s.r.l. type. Regarding the application in analogy of 
the s.p.a. framework, it is true that the body has the aim of safeguarding the interests of third 
parties; however, it cannot be considered as an element that improves the efficiency and the 
transparency of the company on the capital markets. It means that, according to this 
interpretation, s.p.a. provisions that regulate its functioning shall not be applied by analogy. 
Therefore, the designation would become mandatory only if the dimensional requirements 
included in Article 2477 (Subsection 3) of the Civil Code were overtaken.  
 
 
109 Article 2345-bis of the Civil Code states that the companies established as s.r.l. have the possibility to compose the financial 
statements in abbreviate form if specific dimensional requirements are correctly fulfilled.  
110 POLICARO. Dalle s.r.l. emittenti sui portali online di equity crowdfunding alle s.r.l. aperte. «senza deviazione dalla norma, 
il progresso non è possibile», in La società a responsabilità limitata: un modello transtipico alla prova del Codice della Crisi, 
2020, p. 117.   
111 BENAZZO. Categorie di quote, diritti di voto e governance della 'nuovissima' s.r.l., Rivista delle Società, Fasc. 5/6, 2018, 
p. 1466. 
112 Article 4, Subsection 1, b) of D.L. 3/2015.  
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Nevertheless, it remains the option of the company to introduce the body autonomously and 
optionally in the corporate bylaws (Article 2477, Subsection 1). However, Article 2475 of the 
Civil Code (reference to Article 2381) states that the adequacy of the organizational, 
administrative and accounting structures shall be carefully assessed by the management. Thus, 
if its presence was considered as necessary in this sense (regardless of the limits established by 




3.2 Operations on own shares 
 
 
Article 26, Subsection 6, of Section IX leads to the disapplication of Article 2474 of the Civil 
Code, which denies s.r.l. companies to perform operations on own shares. As a consequence, it 
is allowed the implementation of incentive plans consisting of shares assignation to employees, 
associates, managers and other workers (such as “prestatori d’opera e di servizi”). It is 
important underlying that the exemption, initially addressed only to innovative start-ups, was 
extended to every SME after D.L. 50/2017. Moreover, the operations shall be realized within 
the limits of the distributable profits and the available reserves resulting from the last approved 
balance sheet113. In other words, the limits that assure the integrity of the share capital shall be 
applied by analogy from the s.p.a. regulatory framework114.  
 
Furthermore, it was observed that the new provisions represent a stronger opening towards 
those kind of operations, if compared with the s.p.a rules115: indeed, the latter permit only loans 
or warranties aimed at shares purchases or subscriptions performed by employees of the 
enterprise. The operations could be arranged in order to attract human resources with high 
competences in industries at high technological value, providing them a kind of remuneration 




113 MALTONI, SPADA. L’impresa start up innovativa costituita in società a responsabilità limitata, Rivista del Notariato, Fasc. 
5, 2013, p. 1129. 
114 Massima del Comitato Interregionale dei Consigli Notarili delle Tre Venezie, I.N. 13, “Limiti all’acquisto di proprie 
partecipazioni”. 
115 CAPELLI. L’equity based crowdfunding e i diritti del socio. V Convegno Annuale dell’associazione italiana dei professori 
universitari di diritto commerciale “Orizzonti del diritto commerciale”, 2014, p. 7. 
116 GUIZZARDI.  L'impresa startup innovativa costituita in forma di s.r.l., Giurisprudenza Commerciale, Vol. 43, Fasc. 4, 
2016, p. 570. 
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Even if there are some differences, it could be plausible applying by analogy some s.p.a. 
provisions since the relevant characteristics of the operations are similar in both types of 
society117. In particular, the operation on own shares shall be recorded in the balance sheet as a 
negative reserve, as established by Article 2357-ter, Subsection 4, of the Civil Code118. 
Furthermore, other provisions that could be applied by analogy concern the necessary 
authorization of the shareholders’ meeting and the suspension of pre-emption, voting and profit 
rights with regards to the shares repurchased119. In any case, those shares will be taken into 

























117 GUIZZARDI.  L'impresa startup innovativa costituita in forma di s.r.l., Giurisprudenza Commerciale, Vol. 43, Fasc. 4, 
2016, p. 570; BENAZZO, La s.r.l. start-up innovativa, Le Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate, Vol. 37, Fasc. 1, 2014, pp. 124-
125. 
118 Massima del Comitato Interregionale dei Consigli Notarili delle Tre Venezie, I.N. 13, “Limiti all’acquisto di proprie 
partecipazioni”. 
119 Massima del Consiglio Notarile di Milano n. 179, “Acquisto di quote proprie da parte di s.r.l. PMI”. 
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1.  Towards the s.p.a. type  
 
 
Membership shares of companies established as s.r.l. are regulated by Article 2468 of the Civil 
Code. As stated by the provision, members shall hold social rights in proportion with the 
participating share detained, which in turn is computed according to the initial capital injection. 
However, it remains still possible attributing special rights to selected members: those rights 
could be related to the management of the company or to the profit distribution, as established 
by Subsection 3120. When transfers of such membership shares occur, it was observed that those 
special rights cannot be shifted to the new acquirer121. Lastly, unless otherwise established by 
the corporate bylaws, those rights could be modified only if there is the unanimous approval of 
the members.  
 
Article 26 (Subsection 2) of D.L. 179/2012 introduced new rules into the regulatory framework 
of the s.r.l. type: indeed, it allows innovative star-ups to issue classes of shares, attaching them 
different rights and freely determining their content. In other words, those provisions represent 
a derogation from what stated by Article 2468 of the Civil Code, according to which 
membership shares cannot be represented by stocks and cannot be object of public offering on 
capital markets. The rule, originally addressed only to innovative start-ups, was extended in 
2017 to every SME, regardless of the nature of the activity performed.  
 
Another important element that has to be underlined is that the lawfulness of different classes 
of shares could create obstacles to the possibility of attributing particular rights directly to the 
members, according to what established by Article 2468, Subsection 3, of the Civil Code. 
However, it was observed that a member could detain both ordinary membership units and 




120 NOTARI. Diritti particolari dei soci e categorie speciali di partecipazioni, Analisi giuridica dell'economia, Fasc.2, 2003, p. 
325.  
121 NOTARI. Diritti particolari dei soci e categorie speciali di partecipazioni, Analisi giuridica dell'economia, Fasc.2, 2003, p. 
333. 
122 Massima del Consiglio Notarile di Milano n. 171, “Nozione di categorie di quote di s.r.l. PMI”. 
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As observed by the Notarial Council of Milan123, shares included into the same class could:  
 
i. have the same “measure”, that shall be indicated in the corporate bylaws along with 
their total number,   
ii. or have divisible measure, like the membership shares issued according the ordinary 
regulatory framework pertaining the s.r.l. type.  
 
The former are denominated “standardized shares” and are characterized by the equality of the 
measure and of the rights attached to them. The shares included into the second category are 
called “non-standardized” and are characterized simply by the equality of the different rights 
attributed to their owners. Moreover, regarding this last category, measure and total number do 
not need to be indicated in the corporate bylaws, since both depend on the circulation among 
the different members. Both types of classes are considered as lawful.  
 
As observed by a scholar, the possibility of SMEs established as s.r.l. to issue classes of shares 
in derogation from Article 2468 (Subsections 2 and 3) of the Civil Code implies that 
membership shares themselves tend to acquire features typical of the shares issued by a s.p.a., 
in terms of objectivization and standardization124. This possibility seems contrasting what 
declared in the Corporate Law’s Reform of 2003, according to which “not having the possibility 
to issue classes of shares is coherent with the characteristics of the s.r.l. type, because it would 
imply their objectivization and the breakage of the link with the members who detain them”125. 
Furthermore, the provisions included in Article 26 of D.L. 179/2012 could be also interpreted 
as a derogation from Article 2468 (Subsection 1) of the Civil Code, according to which 
membership shares cannot be represented by stocks. According to this interpretation, 
companies which could benefit from the favourable framework could pass from special rights 
attributed to the members towards special rights directly attached to the shares; it follows an 
objectivization and a standardization of the shares issued belonging to a certain class126. Indeed, 
inside the same class, all the shares shall be characterized by the same rights attached and, as a 




123 Massima del Consiglio Notarile di Milano n. 171, “Nozione di categorie di quote di s.r.l. PMI”. 
124 GUIZZARDI.  L'impresa startup innovativa costituita in forma di s.r.l., Giurisprudenza Commerciale, Vol. 43, Fasc. 4, 
2016, pp. 563-564. 
125 CAPELLI. L’equity based crowdfunding e i diritti del socio. V Convegno Annuale dell’associazione italiana dei professori 
universitari di diritto commerciale “Orizzonti del diritto commerciale”, 2014, pp. 8-9; GUIZZARDI.  L'impresa startup 
innovativa costituita in forma di s.r.l., Giurisprudenza Commerciale, Vol. 43, Fasc. 4, 2016, p. 564. 
126 BENAZZO, La s.r.l. start-up innovativa, Le Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate, Vol. 37, Fasc. 1, 2014, p. 116. 
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The thesis was also confirmed by a scholar, according to which, however, the shares’ 
standardization and objectivization does not come from the notion of class, but from their 
intrinsic direction towards the market127. Also, such standardization was assessed as 
representative of the aim of the Legislator of easing the SME raising-capital process through 
new financing channels128.  
 
The new provisions remove one of the most important existing differences between s.p.a. and 
s.r.l. and, at the same time, is coherent with the fundraising process through equity 
crowdfunding platforms129. Indeed, the share categorization allows the enterprise to adapt the 
offering to the needs and to the preferences of the crowdfunders, defining in advance the roles 
that they are going to assume and facilitating the fundraising process130. In other words, the 
issuance by the companies of different classes of shares, allows investors to choose among 
several options, which differ in terms of rights that could be acquired and price that has to be 
sustained.  
 
However, it was noticed that the approaching between s.r.l. and s.p.a. is only partial because, 
regarding innovative start-ups (also those which raise capital through equity crowdfunding 
platforms), the categorization of the shares does not necessarily imply the standardization of all 
of them, as for the s.p.a. type131. In this regard, it was observed that, despite the approaching 
between the two types of society could suggest a standardization of every membership share, 
there are no limitations about the possibility of the enterprise of “categorizing” only part of the 
shares issued132. Indeed, shares categorization can concern only those shares that are issued to 
“investor members” on the crowdfunding platforms, which could detain shares that are 





127 CIAN. S.r.l. PMI, s.r.l., S.p.A.: schemi argomentativi per una ricostruzione del sistema, Rivista delle Società, Vol. 63, Fasc. 
4, 2018, p. 831. 
128 SANTORO. Tentativi di sviluppo di un mercato secondario delle quote di società a responsabilità limitata, in La società a 
responsabilità limitata: un modello transtipico alla prova del Codice della Crisi, 2020, p. 282.   
129 GUIZZARDI.  L'impresa startup innovativa costituita in forma di s.r.l., Giurisprudenza Commerciale, Vol. 43, Fasc. 4, 
2016, pp. 564. 
130 GUIZZARDI.  L'impresa startup innovativa costituita in forma di s.r.l., Giurisprudenza Commerciale, Vol. 43, Fasc. 4, 
2016, pp. 564-565. 
131 GUIZZARDI.  L'impresa startup innovativa costituita in forma di s.r.l., Giurisprudenza Commerciale, Vol. 43, Fasc. 4, 
2016, p. 567. 
132 MALTONI, SPADA. L’impresa start up innovativa costituita in società a responsabilità limitata, Rivista del Notariato, Fasc. 
5, 2013, p. 122; CIAN. S.r.l. PMI, s.r.l., S.p.A.: schemi argomentativi per una ricostruzione del sistema, Rivista delle Società, 
Vol. 63, Fasc. 4, 2018, pp. 831-832. 
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Furthermore, the possibility of the s.r.l. company to issue different classes of shares could not 
be compliant with the principle of central relevance of all the members: however, it was 
observed that an “entrepreneurial member” (“socio imprenditore”) shall be present in any case 
in this type of company133. Lastly, as mentioned before, despite the approaching towards the 
s.p.a. type, the provisions included in Section IX does not provide any explicit indication about 
the possibility to apply in analogy the related regulatory framework (for example, what happens 
when shareholders’ meeting decisions have an impact on a certain class of shares?).  
 
 
1.1 Compatibility between membership shares with special rights and classes of shares 
with different rights attached  
 
 
As mentioned before, the possibility of s.r.l. SMEs to issue classes of shares with different 
rights attached (Article 26, Subsection 2, of D.L. 179/2012) joins the provisions related to the 
attribution of special rights to selected members established by Article 2468 of the Civil Code. 
However, those two sets of provisions are characterized by relevant differences which could 
bring out compatibility issues between them.  
 
In particular, regarding the former, there is a diversification of the features related to the share 
objective content, which leads to the creation of several classes of shares that could be subject 
to public offerings through crowdfunding platforms134. On the other hand, attributing special 
rights to selected members differentiates only their position (and not the shares detained) with 
respect to the other ones135. Moreover, as observed by the Notarial Council of Milan, it is lawful 
identifying a plurality of members attributing them the same special rights136; however, in this 
case there will not emerge a class, but simply a plurality of special rights attributed to members 
specifically indicated in the corporate bylaws. Lastly, the transfer of membership shares will 
not lead to the shift of the rights from the seller to the new member; nevertheless, it could be 
allowed the transferability of the rights jointly with the share transfer, if indicated in the 
corporate bylaws.  
 
 
133 SPERANZIN. Piccole-medie imprese tra autonomia statutaria e ibridazione dei tipi (con particolare riferimento alle 
partecipazioni prive del diritto di voto), Rivista delle società, Vol. 63, Fascicolo 2/3, 2018, p. 347. 
134 CAPELLI. L’equity based crowdfunding e i diritti del socio. V Convegno Annuale dell’associazione italiana dei professori 
universitari di diritto commerciale “Orizzonti del diritto commerciale”, 2014, pp. 8-10. 
135 NOTARI. Diritti particolari dei soci e categorie speciali di partecipazioni, Analisi giuridica dell'economia, Fasc.2, 2003, p. 
326. 
136 Massima del Consiglio Notarile di Milano n. 171, “Nozione di categorie di quote di s.r.l. PMI”. 
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However, uncertainty arises about their co-existence inside the company that could benefit from 
the favourable framework. As stated by the Notarial Council of Milan, the registered capital 
could be simultaneously composed by both “individual” membership shares and classes of 
shares137. Thus, directly attributing special rights to selected members and attaching particular 
rights to shares belonging to a certain class are not mutually exclusive, since it does not exist 
any rule that prohibits this possibility. Therefore, in a crowdfunding scenario there could exist 
also membership shares with special rights according to Article 2468 of the Civil Code and 
detained, for example, by “entrepreneurial members”.  
 
Lastly, it is important underlying that the categorization and the standardization of the 
membership shares issued shall not be considered as necessary or compulsory in order to offer 
them to the public138; indeed, it is possible issuing on crowdfunding platforms membership 
shares equal to those detained by the founders. The possibility to create different classes of 
shares has the purpose of shaping the offering in order to get the best results in terms of capital 
raising. Moreover, it allows crowdfunders interested only in the economic return of the 
investment (and not in the management of the company) to get shares compliant and more 
suitable with this purpose139.  
 
 
2. Issuance of shares’ classes  
 
 
As established by Article 2468 (Subsection 3) of the Civil Code, the attribution of special rights 
to selected members requires the unanimous consent, since personalistic distinctions will 
emerge among them. On the other hand, issuances of different classes of shares, which could 
be realized assuring the principle of equal treatment among the members, can be interpreted as 
changes of the corporates’ bylaws: those changes simply require the consent of the majorities 




137 Massima del Consiglio Notarile di Milano n. 171, “Nozione di categorie di quote di s.r.l. PMI”. 
138 GUACCERO. La start-up innovativa in forma di società a responsabilità limitata: raccolta di capitale di rischio ed equity 
crowdfunding, Banca borsa e titoli di credito, Vol. 67, Fasc. 6, 2014, p. 716. 
139 GUIZZARDI.  L'impresa startup innovativa costituita in forma di s.r.l., Giurisprudenza Commerciale, Vol. 43, Fasc. 4, 
2016, pp. 564-565. 
140 Massima del Consiglio Notarile di Milano n. 172, “Modalità e condizioni di emissione di categorie di quote di S.r.l. PMI”. 
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In particular, Notarial Council of Milan suggested that only if a violation of the “equal treatment 
principle” occurs, it would be necessary the unanimous consent, applying thus Article 2468, 
Subsection 3, of the Civil Code. In other words, only if the issuance of new classes of shares is 
realized through an offering equally addressed to every member, it could be justified the 
application of the majority rules141. Moreover, those rules could be applied also when the 
issuance of certain classes of shares have an impact on the position of the other members; 
however, in this case it would be required also the approval of the members142 damaged by the 
issuance. Nevertheless, as sustained by other scholars, the issuance of “categorized shares” 
required the unanimous consent of the members, since it determines the opening on the market 
of a company with an inherently close nature143.   
 
 
3. Rights attributable to classes of shares 
 
 
After having described in Paragraph 1 the underlying principles, in this section there will be 
analysed the different types of rights that could be attached to the classes of shares issued. 
Article 26 (Subsection 2) of D.L. 179/2012 states that it is lawful creating “classes of shares 
with different rights attached within the limits imposed by the law”. A first definition of those 
rights is given by Article 2468 (Subsection 3) of the Civil Code, according to which the special 
rights that could be attributed to selected members include both economic and administrative 
ones.  
Concerning the former, it is important pointing out that the text of the Article defines them as 
“special rights related to … profit distribution”. In addition, Subsection 2 of the same Article 
states that the rights could be attributed not necessarily in proportion to the participating share 
detained by the members. As a consequence, it could be inferred that it is lawful having classes 




141 Massima del Consiglio Notarile di Milano n. 172, “Modalità e condizioni di emissione di categorie di quote di S.r.l. PMI”. 
142 which could detain either special rights according to Art. 2468, Subsection 3, or different classes of shares. 
143 SPERANZIN. Piccole-medie imprese tra autonomia statutaria e ibridazione dei tipi (con particolare riferimento alle 
partecipazioni prive del diritto di voto), Rivista delle società, Vol. 63, Fascicolo 2/3, 2018, pp. 353-354. 




Moreover, Notarial Council of Milan states that even the clauses that put a maximum limit in 
terms of profit distribution are lawful: such limits could be expressed either in absolute terms, 
or in relative terms (conditioned on certain parameters, such as the share capital) or in relation 
to the temporal dimension (for example, it is lawful that those rights could be assigned only 
starting from a certain date)145.  
However, as observed by a scholar, adopting a wider notion of “economic rights” could enlarge 
the possibilities given to the freedom of contract146: in particular, it could be recognized to the 
members not only the right of receiving a fix amount from the profits realized by the company 
(thus, restricting the amount distributable to the other members), but also, for example, 
withdrawals’ rights ad nutum or the right of differential participation to the corporate losses 
within the limits of the Patto Leonino. However, it was suggested that among those special 
rights cannot be included rights related to the reserve distribution147. Furthermore, other authors 
perform a comparison between s.p.a. and s.r.l. shares with stronger economic rights attached: 
in particular, it was suggested that the latter could be considered as more attractive because of 
their higher (and typical) exclusivity148. Lastly, it is important underlying that those “economic 
rights” are not explicitly mentioned by the Legislator in the text of the Article 26 of D.L. 
179/2012. Nevertheless, they could be included within the more general admissibility of issuing 
“classes of shares with different rights attached”. 
Notwithstanding the importance of the shares with special economic rights attached, in the 
following paragraphs there will be analysed more in detail only the administrative rights: in 
particular, it was suggested that different types could be attributed to the members149. Among 
them, it is important mentioning the rights of: i) directly managing the company; ii) designating 
an administrator; iii) veto on particular corporate decisions. Furthermore, Subsection 2 of 
Article 2468 of the Civil Code states that the rights could be attributed not necessarily in 
proportion to the participating share detained by the members: as a consequence, it could be 
considered as lawful the attribution of non-proportional voting rights. 
 
 
145 Massima del Consiglio Notarile di Milano n. 189, “Clausole che pongono un «tetto massimo» al diritto agli utili (artt. 2247, 
2265, 2350 e 2433 c.c.)”. 
146 ROSSI. Appunti in tema di particolari diritti dei soci di s.r.l., Rivista di diritto civile, Vol. 58, Fasc. 5, 2012, pp. 475-476.  
147 NOTARI. Diritti particolari dei soci e categorie speciali di partecipazioni, Analisi giuridica dell'economia, Fasc.2, 2003, p. 
331.  
148 GROSSO. Le categorie di quote nelle società a responsabilità limitata alla luce dell’esperienza delle categorie di azioni, in 
La società a responsabilità limitata: un modello transtipico alla prova del Codice della Crisi, 2020, p. 196.  




The freedom of contract of a s.r.l. company allows the attribution to selected members of 
different kind of rights compared to those illustrated in Article 2468, Subsection 3, of the Civil 
Code150. The thesis according to which the companies that could benefit from the new 
regulatory framework could issue classes of shares with different rights attached was sustained 
by several scholars151: they state that the shares belonging to a certain class have an 
homogeneous and standardized content, linked to the shares themselves and not to the members. 
This interpretation was challenged by other authors, since the investment solicitation through 
the crowdfunding procedure does not necessarily require the standardization of the shares 
issued152.  
 
The attribution of special rights represents a central point of Article 26 of D.L. 179/2012. In 
particular, although the issuance of classes of shares with different voting rights attached is 
explicitly legitimated (Subsection 3), the previous Subsection states that the shares’ content 
could be freely determined, within the limits imposed by the law (Subsection 2). Indeed, as 
observed by the Notarial Council of Milan, the rights mentioned have simply an illustrative 
purpose, as for the administrative and economic rights cited in Article 2468, Subsection 3, of 
the Civil Code153. As previously outlined, the freedom of contract in the determination of the 
rights that could be attached to the classes of shares is delimited by some limits imposed by the 
law.  Among those limits, it is important mentioning what established by Article 2265 of the 
Civil Code (“divieto del Patto Leonino”) and the duty of recognizing to the members rights 
according to what established by Article 2473 of the Civil Code154. Moreover, the content of 
the rights attached to the classes of shares issued shall be in any case reconcilable with the 
special rights eventually attributed according to Article 2468, Subsection 3, of the Civil Code155. 
Within those limitations, the Legislator confers large autonomy to the company in determining 
exactly what rights are going to be attached to the various classes of shares156.  
 
 
150 NOTARI. Diritti particolari dei soci e categorie speciali di partecipazioni, Analisi giuridica dell'economia, Fasc. 2, 2003, 
pp. 330-331 
151 GUIZZARDI.  L'impresa startup innovativa costituita in forma di s.r.l., Giurisprudenza Commerciale, Vol. 43, Fasc. 4, 
2016, pp. 565-567; BENAZZO, La s.r.l. start-up innovativa, Le Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate, Vol. 37, Fasc. 1, 2014, p. 
117; MALTONI, SPADA. L’impresa start up innovativa costituita in società a responsabilità limitata, Rivista del Notariato, 
Fasc. 5, 2013, p. 1123; CAPELLI. L’equity based crowdfunding e i diritti del socio. V Convegno Annuale dell’associazione 
italiana dei professori universitari di diritto commerciale “Orizzonti del diritto commerciale”, 2014, pp. 8-10. 
152 GUACCERO. La start-up innovativa in forma di società a responsabilità limitata: raccolta di capitale di rischio ed equity 
crowdfunding, Banca borsa e titoli di credito, Vol. 67, Fasc. 6, 2014, p. 717. 
153 Massima del Consiglio Notarile di Milano n. 173, “Contenuto dei diritti diversi delle categorie di quote di s.r.l. PMI”. 
154 Massima del Consiglio Notarile di Milano n. 173, “Contenuto dei diritti diversi delle categorie di quote di s.r.l. PMI”. 
155 Massima del Comitato Interregionale dei Consigli Notarili delle Tre Venezie I.N. 2, “I diversi diritti attribuibili alle categorie 
di quote nelle s.r.l.-PMI”. 
156 GUIZZARDI.  L'impresa startup innovativa costituita in forma di s.r.l., Giurisprudenza Commerciale, Vol. 43, Fasc. 4, 
2016, p. 566. 
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After a brief step back related to the “freedom of contract” conferred to s.r.l. companies, there 
will be analysed more in detail the administrative rights. First of all, the company has the 
possibility to issue classes of shares which attribute to the owners stronger administrative rights, 
such as multiple voting rights and stronger inspection powers. Article 26 of D.L. 179/2012 does 
not explicitly establish this possibility: again, it has to be included within the general freedom 
of issuing classes of shares with different rights. Indeed, it was suggested by a scholar that the 
expansion of the rights attached to a certain class could be considered as lawful157. Nevertheless, 
it is important underlying that those kinds of shares are not appropriate in terms of equity 
crowdfunding offerings, especially when the stronger rights concern the management of the 
company; indeed, this type of raising-capital procedure is based on contributions from a high 
number of members potentially located worldwide. Even though the share of capital issued 
through crowdfunding platforms is on average equal to 10,4%158, the attribution of stronger 
administrative rights to unknown members could create unbalances in terms of corporate 
governance. Moreover, also different forms of risks could arise, such as those related to the 
sharing of sensitive information. However, shares with multiple voting rights attached could be 
coherent with the interests of subjects more interested in the management of the company, such 
as Venture Capitalists, business incubators and Business Angels159. As mentioned before, it was 
observed an increasingly presence of those institutional investors alongside with the crowd160. 
However, concerning the Italian equity crowdfunding market, the practice is not widespread: 
indeed, it emerged that, among the 708 legal persons that invested in the 269 campaigns 
completed from 2019 to the beginning of 2020, only 8 and 5 are respectively Venture Capitalists 
and Business Angels161.  
 
In an equity crowdfunding scenario, it could be more reasonable issuing classes of shares with 
limited rights attached if compared to the ordinary ones162. Among them, it is important 
mentioning the issuance of classes of shares characterized by the limitation or the absence of 
the right of underwriting a capital increase in a subsequent financing round.  
 
157 CIAN. S.r.l. PMI, s.r.l., S.p.A.: schemi argomentativi per una ricostruzione del sistema, Rivista delle Società, Vol. 63, Fasc. 
4, 2018, p. 835. 
158 OSSERVATORI ENTREPRENEURSHIP & FINANCE. 5° Report italiano sul CrowdInvesting, Politecnico di Milano, 
School of Management, 2020, p. 20. 
159 GUIZZARDI.  L'impresa startup innovativa costituita in forma di s.r.l., Giurisprudenza Commerciale, Vol. 43, Fasc. 4, 
2016, p. 568. 
160 WANG, MAHMOOD, SISMEIRO, VULKAN. The evolution of equity crowdfunding: Insights from co-investments of 
angels and the crowd, Research Policy, Elsevier, Vol. 48(8), 2019, p. 1. 
161 OSSERVATORI ENTREPRENEURSHIP & FINANCE. 5° Report italiano sul CrowdInvesting, Politecnico di Milano, 
School of Management, 2020, p. 37.  
162 CIAN. S.r.l. PMI, s.r.l., S.p.A.: schemi argomentativi per una ricostruzione del sistema, Rivista delle Società, Vol. 63, Fasc. 
4, 2018, p. 834. 
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This right is normally attributed to s.r.l. members according to what established by Article 
2481-bis of the Civil Code. A further clarification shall be made with regards to the s.r.l. SMEs 
that already issued different classes of shares: when those companies arrange a capital increase, 
they could freely decide the category (or the categories) of the shares that will be issued. 
However, as observed by the Notarial Council of Milan, every member will have the mentioned 
pre-emption right on the new shares issued proportionally with their current participating shares 
and regardless of the classes already owned163. The ratio of the provision is safeguarding the 
participating shares of the members, reducing the dilution of their position when a capital 
increase occurs. Nevertheless, this kind of right was assessed as disposable by the Notarial 
Council of Milan, since not indissolubly linked to the s.r.l. type. The principle according to 
which how such clauses could be introduced in the corporate bylaws was discussed in the 
doctrine164: in particular, whether it is sufficient only the majority required for the corporate 
bylaws modifications or if it is necessary also the consensus of every member legitimated to 
underwrite a capital increase. Lastly, this right shall be offered in any case to the members if 
the capital increase follows a reduction of capital below the minimum threshold established by 
Article 2482-ter of the Civil Code165.  
 
Moreover, it is lawful issuing classes of shares with no or limited inspection and information 
rights attached, differently from what established by Article 2476 (Subsection 2) of the Civil 
Code166. In any case, the possibility to consult the shareholder’s register and, if existing, the 
Corporate Record (“Libro delle decisioni dei soci”) cannot be excluded to the members167. The 
issuance of those classes is extremely coherent with the nature of the equity crowdfunding 
offerings. Indeed, attributing those rights to every member (potentially unknown) could get 
them access to private and sensitive information related to the company: this scenario could 





163 Massima del Comitato Interregionale dei Consigli Notarili delle Tre Venezie I.N. 5, “Diritto di prelazione negli aumenti di 
capitale di s.r.l.-PMI in presenza di categorie di quote”. 
164 ALLECA, Aumento a pagamento e tutela del socio nella s.r.l., Rivista di Diritto Societario, Fasc. 4, 2017, pp. 983 and ff.  
165 Massima del Consiglio Notarile di Milano n. 175, “Categorie di quote con diritto di opzione limitato o escluso nelle S.r.l. 
PMI”.  
166 GUIZZARDI.  L'impresa startup innovativa costituita in forma di s.r.l., Giurisprudenza Commerciale, Vol. 43, Fasc. 4, 
2016, p. 576. 
167 Massima del Consiglio Notarile di Milano n. 176, “Categorie di quote con limitazione dei diritti di controllo nelle S.r.l. 
PMI”. 
168 CIAN. S.r.l. PMI, s.r.l., S.p.A.: schemi argomentativi per una ricostruzione del sistema, Rivista delle Società, Vol. 63, Fasc. 
4, 2018, pp. 834-835. 
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It is true that the ordinary member does not have high competences related to the industry in 
which the firm operates; however, it is possible that among the crowdfunders are included 
members that have “sensitive information gathering” as exclusive purpose. This is the reason 
why the inclusion of those classes of shares could limit (but not eliminate) this kind of risk. 
Even if the ratio is coherent, the issuance of shares without information and inspection rights 
attached could not be positively seen by new potential members; and, as a consequence, it could 
negatively impact the reputation of the company. However, as observed by the Notarial Council 
of Milan, information and inspection rights could be limited or even excluded from some 
classes of shares only if a supervisory body is in charge for the controlling function169. 
Therefore, the possibility to exclude some members from those rights shall be counterbalanced 
by the presence of a body that becomes compulsory only when the s.r.l. dimensional 
requirements are overtaken.   
 
Lastly, the text of the Article 26 (Subsection 3) of D.L. 179/2012 states that it is lawful issuing 
classes of shares without or with limited voting rights attached: this is the only type of right 
explicitly mentioned in Section IX. Moreover, it is important underlying that the topic related 
to the issuance by s.r.l. companies of shares without voting rights was already a point of 
discussion even before the intervention of the Legislator in 2012. In particular, the prevailing 
doctrine expresses a contrary opinion; however, other authors asserted the legitimacy of shares 
without or with limited voting rights attributed to the members170. 
 
 
3.1 Classes of shares and voting rights 
 
 
The previous paragraph has illustrated the types of administrative rights that could be attributed 
to different classes of shares: among them, it is important focusing on those shares characterized 
by no voting rights attached (or limited on particular topics). The legitimacy of those shares has 
interesting consequences in an equity crowdfunding context: indeed, it makes those instruments 
more suitable with the needs and the preferences of some investors.  
 
169 Massima del Consiglio Notarile di Milano n. 176, “Categorie di quote con limitazione dei diritti di controllo nelle S.r.l. 
PMI”. 
170 SPERANZIN. Partecipazioni senza diritto di voto nella s.r.l., in La struttura finanziaria ed i bilanci delle società di capitali, 
Studi in onore di G.E. Colombo, Torino, 2011, pp. 213 and ff. 
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In particular, those that have not the aim of actively participating to the social activities; in other 
words, those that aim at “simply” realizing an economic return from this kind of investment171. 
As mentioned before, the provisions related to this topic are included in Article 26 (Subsection 
3) of D.L. 179/2012, which therefore introduces new elements regarding the governance of the 
s.r.l. companies compliant with the status of innovative start-up (provisions then extended to 
innovative SMEs and SMEs). In particular, the Legislator states that those enterprises have the 
possibility to issue classes of shares without or with different voting rights attached compared 
to those detained by common members172. In other words, it is possible assigning them voting 
rights not proportional with respect to the share of capital detained, limited to pre-defined 
topics, or subordinated to the occurrence of specific conditions: actually, the list has a mere 
illustrative purpose. Moreover, the new provision represents a derogation from the principle of 
proportionality established by Article 2479 (Subsection 5) of the Civil Code173. Therefore, it is 
lawful having inside the corporate structure members with lower or no interest concerning the 
management of the firm174. Regarding s.r.l. SMEs, the Legislator has not formally allowed them 
to issue classes of shares without voting rights attached, as explicitly stated for innovative start-
ups established as s.r.l.; as observed by the Notarial Council of Milan, the extension to those 
companies could be inferred by considering the recall, in Subsection 3, of the firms mentioned 
in Subsection 2 of Article 26 of D.L. 179/2012. In any case, this possibility seems to be granted 
also to SMEs established as s.r.l., since included within the more general admissibility of classes 
of shares with different rights attached175.  
 
Traditionally, it was common opinion that companies established as s.r.l. would not have the 
possibility of issuing membership shares without voting rights attributed to the members: 
among the motivations, the principle of unavoidability of the voting rights (Article 2479, 
Subsection 5, of the Civil Code). The derecognition of the voting rights, or their limitation on 
certain topics, makes the participating share closer to an investment instrument rather than to a 
mean used to actively participate to the corporate activities. For sure, members without voting 
rights will not be able to take part to the shareholders’ meetings. However, it is not clear if those 
members kept the possibility of challenging assembly decisions.   
 
171 GUIZZARDI.  L'impresa startup innovativa costituita in forma di s.r.l., Giurisprudenza Commerciale, Vol. 43, Fasc. 4, 
2016, p. 568. 
172 Massima del Consiglio Notarile di Milano n. 174, “Categorie di quote a voto ridotto o maggiorato nelle s.r.l. PMI”. 
173 GUIZZARDI.  L'impresa startup innovativa costituita in forma di s.r.l., Giurisprudenza Commerciale, Vol. 43, Fasc. 4, 
2016, p. 568. 
174 GUIZZARDI.  L'impresa startup innovativa costituita in forma di s.r.l., Giurisprudenza Commerciale, Vol. 43, Fasc. 4, 
2016, pp. 564-565. 
175 POLICARO. Dalle s.r.l. emittenti sui portali online di equity crowdfunding alle s.r.l. aperte. «senza deviazione dalla norma, 
il progresso non è possibile», in La società a responsabilità limitata: un modello transtipico alla prova del Codice della Crisi, 
2020, pp. 114-115. 
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In companies established as s.p.a., the absence of voting rights inhibits the investors in 
challenging assembly decisions not compliant with the common law or with the corporate 
bylaws (Article 2377 of the Civil Code). However, regarding those companies, this right is in 
any case recognized to the supervisory body.  
 
Concerning s.r.l. SMEs, uncertainty arises about the possibility that members which hold 
membership shares without voting rights have about challenging those kind of decisions, as 
established by Article 2479-ter of the Civil Code. Denying this right would lead to a lack of 
protection for those funders not compensated by the compulsory presence of a supervisory 
body. In this case, it is important distinguishing between the rights of participating to the 
decision (which includes, as an example, intervention, information, control, proposition and 
challenge rights) and the voting rights stricto sensu, which could be interpreted as the rights of 
taking part to the formation of the assembly decisions. Only the latter could be excluded from 
a certain class of shares, while the former have to be considered as non-disposable176. It means 
that, according to this interpretation, the member still maintains the possibility to challenge the 
corporate decisions, even if no voting rights are attached to the shares detained.  
 
However, the eventual recognition of those rights to every member could jeopardize the correct 
functioning of the different corporate bodies, especially when companies decide to raise capital 
through equity crowdfunding platforms177. Moreover, in this context members could be 
potentially scattered all over the world and the exercise of those rights could become difficult 
from a practical point of view. A solution in this sense could be incentivizing corporate 
structures in which those rights are legally attributed to a single entity, such as the platform 
itself, and not to the crowd. The scheme, which will be analysed in the following sections, is 
called “Nominee Structure” and it is already implemented with high success by a British 
platform called Seedrs.  
 
The exemption confirms the dichotomy between rights attributed to the single member and 
rights attached directly to the membership share. Thus, it is important taking as reference the 
provisions addressed to the s.p.a. type. Article 2351 of the Civil Code states that s.p.a. shares 
could be subjected only to a “disempowerment” of the voting rights attached.  
 
176 SPERANZIN. Piccole-medie imprese tra autonomia statutaria e ibridazione dei tipi (con particolare riferimento alle 
partecipazioni prive del diritto di voto), Rivista delle società, Vol. 63, Fascicolo 2/3, 2018, pp. 351-352. 
177 POLICARO. Dalle s.r.l. emittenti sui portali online di equity crowdfunding alle s.r.l. aperte. «senza deviazione dalla norma, 
il progresso non è possibile», in La società a responsabilità limitata: un modello transtipico alla prova del Codice della Crisi, 
2020, p. 115. 
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In particular, it was lawful only the creation of shares without voting rights, or with voting 
rights limited to defined topics or subordinated to certain conditions. The numbers of these 
shares shall not exceed the 50% of the total equity. However, in 2014 it was introduced also the 
possibility to create shares with multiple voting rights attached: in this case, each share could 
attribute to the owner at maximum 3 votes.  
 
Section IX does not prescribe any limitation in percentage terms to the shares without or with 
multiple voting rights which could be issued by an enterprise that can benefit from the 
favourable framework. Therefore, those provisions (included in Article 2351 Subsections 2 and 
4 of the Civil Code) could have been applied by analogy also by the open s.r.l. SMEs. However, 
the Notarial Council of Milan stated that those percentages could be only freely determinable 
by the corporate bylaws178. Indeed, it is true that Subsection 2 recalls what established for s.p.a. 
companies in the Civil Code; however, the Legislator decided to not include in Section IX the 
last part of the Article, related to the maximum amount of those shares that could be issued. It 
derives, according to this interpretation, that the limits established by the Civil Code shall not 
be applied in analogy by s.r.l. companies. Moreover, also other authors expressed the same 
opinion179. Furthermore, concerning the shares that attribute to the owners multiple voting 
rights, it follows that no limits in terms of maximum votes shall be applied (thus, differently 
from what established by Article 2351, Subsection 4, of the Civil Code and by Art 127-
quinquies of the TUF)180.  
 
Lastly, the member could own two different classes of shares which both attribute voting rights. 
In this case, if there are no contrasts with the principles of good faith and correctness, the 
member has the possibility to exercise voting rights in a non-converging way. Moreover, this 
possibility is allowed only if aimed at reserving the withdrawal rights in relation to the classes 






178 This interpretation was confirmed by the “Comitato interregionale dei Consigli Notarili delle Tre Venezie”. I.N. 3.  
179 GUIZZARDI.  L'impresa startup innovativa costituita in forma di s.r.l., Giurisprudenza Commerciale, Vol. 43, Fasc. 4, 
2016, p. 569; CAPELLI. L’equity based crowdfunding e i diritti del socio. V Convegno Annuale dell’associazione italiana dei 
professori universitari di diritto commerciale “Orizzonti del diritto commerciale”, 2014, p. 24; CIAN. S.r.l. PMI, s.r.l., S.p.A.: 
schemi argomentativi per una ricostruzione del sistema, Rivista delle Società, Vol. 63, Fasc. 4, 2018, p. 855. 
180 Massima del Consiglio Notarile di Milano n. 174, “Categorie di quote a voto ridotto o maggiorato nelle s.r.l. PMI”. 
181 Massima del Comitato Interregionale dei Consigli Notarili delle Tre Venezie, I.N. 9, “Limiti all’ammissibilità del voto 
divergente nel caso di socio titolare di quote di diverse categorie”. 
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4. Modification of share rights and special meetings 
 
 
A further element that shall be mentioned concerns the legal procedures that have to be followed 
in order to modify the rights attached to certain classes of shares. When the decisions assumed 
during the general meetings have an impact on the classes of shares detained by some 
crowdfunders, it is not clear whether it is sufficient the majority approval or if it is necessary 
the unanimous consent of the members. Regarding the companies established as s.r.l. that issue 
different classes of shares, the Legislator does not provide any specific indication about the 
necessity to call a “special category meeting” when the relative rights are going to be damaged 
or simply modified. The regulatory framework of s.p.a. companies could be applied by analogy: 
Article 2376 of the Civil Code, according to which those decisions have to be approved by a 
“special meeting” which includes all the members of the class damaged, shall be applied also 
on SMEs established as s.r.l, since the protection of the investors which are part of a certain 
class cannot be assured only by withdrawal’s rights. The legitimacy of such mechanism was 
confirmed also by other Notarial Councils182. Thus, in this case, the general shareholders’ 
meeting decision also requires the consensus of the majority of the members which belong to 
the class of shares damaged or modified (according to the modes established by the common 
law and by the corporate bylaws itself). Moreover, dissenting members shall detain in any case 
withdrawals’ rights.  
 
The interpretation was confirmed by the Notarial Council of Milan183: moreover, it was noticed 
that the corporate bylaws could require not only the approval by the majority of the members 
but also their unanimous consent. However, it is not clear if s.p.a. rules shall be applied by 
analogy even if the corporate bylaws does not establish anything about them. In this last case, 
it was observed that general shareholders’ meeting decisions could directly modify the content 
of classes of shares if and only if there is also the unanimous consent of the members affected 
by the decisions184.  
 
 
182 Massima del Comitato Interregionale dei Consigli Notarili delle Tre Venezie, I.N. 11, “Assemblee speciali in presenza di 
quote di categoria”. 
183 Massima del Consiglio Notarile di Milano n. 177, “Assemblee speciali dei titolari di categorie di quote di s.r.l. PMI”. 
184 Without separately convoke them.  
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Lastly, other authors denied the possibility to apply s.p.a. rules in analogy185. In this case, it 
derives that there shall be applied Article 2468, Subsection 4, of the Civil Code, according to 
which the rights attributed to the members could be modified only with their unanimous 
consent, unless the corporate bylaws provides different instructions. In any case, it remains 
possible that special category meetings would be called according to what established by the 




5. Attribution and exercise of the voting rights  
 
 
As mentioned before, classes of shares without voting rights attached have an interesting 
application when they are offered to the crowd through fundraising campaigns. However, the 
eventual legitimacy of those shares could create uncertainties since they are referred to a type 
of society traditionally characterized by a strong relevance of the members on the corporate 
dynamics. After having asserted their legitimacy, this Paragraph analyses in a more concrete 
way how and in which circumstances voting rights are attached to the shares that investors are 
going to purchase on equity crowdfunding platforms. Concerning shares and voting rights, a 
common practice followed by the companies that raise capital through crowdfunding platforms 
is the issuance of two different classes of shares, generally called A and B: typically, the former 
include voting rights, differently from the latter. As observed by the doctrine, the issuance of 
shares with voting rights attached is less frequent in companies which operate in industries 
characterized by an active M&A market or that are managed by “experienced founders” 
(namely, those with previous work experience in the start-up field)186. Moreover, it emerged 
that the issuance of those shares derives also from an imitative behaviour with respect to the 




185 POLICARO. Dalle s.r.l. emittenti sui portali online di equity crowdfunding alle s.r.l. aperte. «senza deviazione dalla norma, 
il progresso non è possibile», in La società a responsabilità limitata: un modello transtipico alla prova del Codice della Crisi, 
2020, p. 115. 
186 CUMMING, MEOLI, VISMARA. Investors’ choices between cash and voting rights: Evidence from dual-class equity 
crowdfunding, Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(8), 2019, p. 10. 
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Regarding the attribution of such classes of shares (A and B187) to crowdfunders, it usually 
depends on the capital that new members are going to invest in the enterprises through the 
platform. Indeed, firms themselves usually define a certain investment threshold related to the 
raising-capital offering: in particular, when the crowdfunders are going to invest an overall 
amount higher than the threshold, they will get shares belonging to the A class; on the contrary, 
when the amount invested is lower, they will get only shares belonging to the lower grade class. 
Concerning the amount of the threshold chosen by an enterprise, it emerged that it is strongly 
correlated with what previously chosen by other companies which operate in a similar industry 
and that decided to raise capital through crowdfunding platforms.  
 
Lastly, enterprises that define a relatively higher threshold are subject to a higher separation 
between ownership and control; in turn, the higher separation negatively influences the odds of 
success of the overall crowdfunding campaign and the possibility to successfully proceed with 
further financing rounds188.  
 
 
5.1 Voting rights delivery methods  
 
 
After having illustrated in which circumstances shares with voting rights attached are issued to 
new members, it is important classifying the former according to different types, depending on 
how the crowdfunding platform is organized. In particular, some scholars differentiate among 
individual, pooled and syndicated voting rights189.  
 
Regarding the former, the crowdfunding platform simply plays an intermediary role: indeed it 
allows the enterprises to raise capital but, when the offering is completed, the platform does not 
play any concrete role concerning the relationship between entrepreneurs and investors. This 




187 Of course, there is no theoretical limit in the number of share classes that could be issued by an enterprise. However, the 
choice of issuing two classes of shares (A and B) represents the most common practice employed by enterprises that raise 
capital through crowdfunding platforms.  
188 CUMMING, MEOLI, VISMARA. Investors’ choices between cash and voting rights: Evidence from dual-class equity 
crowdfunding, Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(8), 2019, p. 14.  
189 ROSSI, VISMARA, MEOLI. Voting Rights Delivery in Investment-Based Crowdfunding: A Cross-Platform Analysis, 
Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, vol. 46, issue 2, No 6, 2019, pp. 4-5. 
51 
 
Let’s consider, such as an example, a company which issues classes of shares through those 
crowdfunding platforms to a multitude of investors: in this case, there will be a corporate 
structure characterized by a broad member base. In an individual voting rights scheme, each 
member will have the possibility to autonomously exercise their voting rights, which, therefore, 
are directly attributed to them. However, given the high number of members, there will 
inevitably arise coordination issues among them. Moreover, considering that the amount 
invested by the common crowdfunders is relatively low, they will have less incentives (but also 
low technical competences) to monitor the corporate dynamics.  
 
Regarding the pooled mode of delivery, the platform often operates as a trustee, managing the 
voting rights on behalf of the crowdfunders. When such a system is adopted, all the votes of the 
investors flow into the hands of the intermediary which could better coordinate all the dispersed 
shareholders. In particular, it emerged that individual and syndicated voting rights190 delivery 
methods are more likely to list a lower number of successful raising-capital offerings, if 
compared to the platforms which are based on pooled voting rights systems. Also from a 
statistical point of view, the pooled voting rights scheme seems performing better compared to 
the others.  
 
The two most important British crowdfunding platforms, Crowdcube and Seedrs, are 
characterized by two different voting rights delivery methods, respectively individual and 
pooled. Concerning the former, it is exclusively applied a classical individual voting rights 
delivery scheme. On the other hand, Seedrs gives to crowdfunders the possibility to choose 
among the two different voting rights delivery methods. Indeed, new members still maintain 
the possibility to request the direct attribution of the voting rights attached to the shares when 
they are acquired on the platform. However, differently from Crowdcube, Seedrs proposes a 
shareholding structure in which the voting rights could be exercised by the platform itself (as 
legal owner of the shares) that operates on behalf of the substantial owners (the crowdfunders). 
The structure was named “Nominee Structure” since relationships of trust tend to emerge 
among the two parties. Some scholars have analysed the performance of the enterprises that 
raise capital through those crowdfunding platforms, distinguishing between the two different 
voting rights delivery methods191. In other words, the study allows to understand the impact of 
the choices in terms of shareholding structure on firm performances. 
 
190 It refers to platforms which require a high minimum investment amount or co-investments among several accredited 
investors. 
191 WALTHOFF-BORM, VANACKER, COLLEWAERT. Equity Crowdfunding, Shareholder Structures, and Firm 
Performance, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 26, Issue 5, 2018, p. 315. 
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It emerged that the Nominee Structure seems to be associated with better financial 
performances; indeed, in the long-run the losses suffered by companies characterized by this 
kind of structure are lower compared to those associated with a direct shareholding structure. 
However, the latter is correlated with better innovative performances, which are measured 
taking into consideration parameters such as the number of patent applications per year. It does 
not convince the motivation according to which the higher number is explained by a greater 
sense of belonging among the shareholders, since in an enterprise with a broad shareholding 
base they would have practical and technical difficulties in proposing new innovative ideas192. 
The higher innovative performance could be explained by more prolific activities performed by 
the founders in a structure in which they could maintain a more relevant decisional power, in 
terms of voting rights detained. In such a structure, it is plausible that new projects could be 
subject to less careful control by the members, which have neither the incentives nor the 
competences to perform an adequate due diligence activity: as a consequence, the rate of 
submission of new patents could increase. Therefore, with regards to the voting rights delivery 
methods, the model that seems assuring the best performance is the Nominee Structure, adopted 
by the crowdfunding platform Seedrs. 
 
 
5.2 Seedrs and its “Nominee Structure” 
 
 
According to the Nominee Structure, the legal owner of the participating shares issued after an 
equity crowdfunding campaign will be Seedrs itself, that will detain the shares on behalf of the 
investors that purchased them on the platform; on the other side, the latter will remain 
substantial owners of the shares. Moreover, the voting rights will be exercised by a specific 
body established by Seedrs for managing all the “portfolio companies”.  
 
The Nominee Structure offers several advantages to the investors with respect to the individual 
voting rights delivery method. First of all, the confluence of the voting rights to a single legal 
owner will reduce the coordination issues that could arise when crowdfunders are scattered over 
the world. Indeed, the presence of a unique legal owner that operates on behalf of the investors 
assure them, even if indirectly, higher voice during the shareholder’s meetings.  
 
192 WALTHOFF-BORM, VANACKER, COLLEWAERT. Equity Crowdfunding, Shareholder Structures, and Firm 
Performance, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 26, Issue 5, 2018, p. 325. 
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Higher voice that they would not have if they decided to autonomously exercise the voting 
rights attached to the shares acquired. In other words, the capacity of “pooled investors” to 
conditionate management decisions is higher than that of the average crowdfunder which acts 
alone193. Indeed, when a company is characterized by a broader member base, the single 
member will have little incentive to carefully monitor the firm activities. 
 
A second important advantage of the Nominee Structure is related to the decisions that have to 
be taken by the members which acquire shares with voting rights attached. During the 
shareholders’ meetings, when important decisions (or decisions that significantly influence 
their position) are going to be taken, they could not have the right competences to understand 
what the best choice would be. If they joint the Nominee Structure, they would attribute to the 
platform their voting rights and, as consequence, all the relevant decisions will be taken by a 
body with higher experience and knowledge about crowdfunding investments. Therefore, a 
structure that allocates all the voting rights to a single formal owner that takes decisions in the 
interests of the investors assures them higher protection. It means that this kind of structure 
gives more power to the investors and lower freedom of action to the entrepreneurs with respect 
to a shareholder’s structure characterized by a broader member base: this could explain why 
innovative performances of enterprises that make use of the Nominee Structure are lower 
compared to the firms characterized by direct shareholding structures194.  
 
Furthermore, the Nominee Structure offers interesting advantages also to the entrepreneurs195. 
First of all, they would not need to interact with every investor that purchased the shares on the 
crowdfunding platform but, on the contrary, only with their representative, Seedrs itself. Indeed, 
if emerged a situation that requires a quick decision-making process, it would be easier 
communicating with a single legal owner rather than with the entire member base. Moreover, 
after overcoming the first stages of development, companies usually arrange further financing 
rounds to sustain their growth. The presence of a corporate structure characterized by a broad 
member base could slow down this process, discouraging new potential investors, such as 
Venture Capitalists and Business Angels. On the contrary, a corporate structure with a lower 
number of interlocutors allows to take those important decisions in shorter time. In other words, 
the Nominee Structure will make less long and complex the development path of a young 
company.  
 
193 ROSSI, VISMARA, MEOLI. Voting Rights Delivery in Investment-Based Crowdfunding: A Cross-Platform Analysis, 
Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, vol. 46, issue 2, No 6, 2019, p. 11. 
194 WALTHOFF-BORM, VANACKER, COLLEWAERT. Equity Crowdfunding, Shareholder Structures, and Firm 




As mentioned before, Seedrs is a crowdfunding platform which allows to the investors the 
choice of the preferred voting rights delivery method. If crowdfunders which purchased the 
shares on the platform decided to adhere to the Nominee Structure, they would pay Seedrs for 
the service provided. The service cost is not a periodic fee; instead, it depends on the total profit 
achieved by the crowdfunder on that specific investment, which will be determined only at the 
exit date. Since the crowdfunding investment is highly illiquid, the exit date usually coincides 
with the IPO of the company or with the takeover date. The profit achieved by the investor at 
the exit date will be equal to the difference between cost originally sustained and price received 
from the sale of the shares themselves. The service cost is then determined applying a success 
fee of 7,5% on the profits achieved. If no profits were gained, no commission would be charged 
on the crowdfunder.  
 
Lastly, Seedrs offers to their crowdfunders also the possibility to opt for the individual voting 
rights delivery method. In this last case, the platform will require one-time investment fee equal 
to the 1,5% of the amount invested (with a cap of 250€). After the payment, no further ongoing 








1. Transfer of s.r.l. membership shares according to the common law 
 
 
As stated by Article 2469 of the Civil Code, membership shares of an ordinary s.r.l. company 
are freely transferable to other members, unless differently established by the corporate bylaws. 
Indeed, the latter could include clauses which impose limits and conditions in the share 
circulation, such as “approval clauses” (“diritti di gradimento”) and/or “pre-emption clauses” 
(“clausole di prelazione”). Moreover, the corporate bylaws could also set up absolute 
prohibitions about membership shares’ transfers: nevertheless, when such limits to the shares’ 
circulation are established, members shall have the possibility to exercise withdrawals’ rights, 
as stated by Article 2473 of the Civil Code. Lastly, the transfer of such membership shares 
requires an official act arranged by a notary, which becomes effective towards the enterprise 
when the document is submitted to the Business Registrar.  
 
It could be inferred that an investment in companies established as s.r.l. is characterized by a 
high degree of illiquidity: indeed, i) it is more difficult finding a potential buyer for such 
membership shares if compared to the shares quoted on regulated markets; ii) the transfer 
procedure is complex and expensive. Therefore, if those two elements are jointly taken into 
consideration, it derives that the investor takes the risk of remaining tied down in the enterprise 
for several years before having the opportunity to exit with a satisfying return. Regarding the 
problem ii), it is important pointing out the recent intervention of the Legislator, which 
introduced provisions aimed at significantly reducing the transfer costs of s.r.l. shares.  
 
If included into the equity crowdfunding context, those elements are sensitive issues, since they 





196 DE LUCA.  Crowdfunding e quote 'dematerializzate' di s.r.l.? prime considerazioni (art. 100 ter, commi 2. Quinquies, Le 
Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate, Vol. 39, Fasc. 1, 2016, p. 2. 
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Regarding the transfer procedures, another important aspect that has to be assessed concerns 
the simultaneous shift to the new owners of the rights attached to the shares sold: according to 
the common law, special rights are directly attributed to the members in compliance with 
Article 2468 of the Civil Code. Therefore, the transfer does not imply the automatic shift of 
those special rights to the new owners; instead, it leads to their cancellation, unless otherwise 
established by the corporate bylaws197. The thesis was confirmed by the Notarial Council of 
Milan: in addition, it was stated that the possibility of issuing classes of shares could lead to a 
different conclusion198: indeed, in this case the transfer of shares belonging to a certain class 
implies also the shift of the special rights which characterize it, unless otherwise established by 
the corporate bylaws.  
 
 
2. The Legislator intervention, the “intermediary registration” 
 
 
As mentioned before, D.L. 3/2015 (converted with modification by Legge n.33 of 2015) 
represents an important intervention by the Legislator because it extends the new regulatory 
framework also to innovative SMEs; however, it has a relevant impact also on the Article 100-
ter of the TUF, which regulates the share circulation among the investors. In particular, it was 
introduced Subsection 2-bis: it states that it is now lawful offering to investors the possibility 
to apply for an alternative way of share circulation (“regime alternativo di intestazione della 
quota” o “intestazione intermediata”) compared to the Civil Code provisions. The new 
modality of shares’ transfer introduced by the Legislator does not erase the regulation already 
included in the Civil Code: instead, it represents an additional option that could be offered by 
the company to its investors199. The purpose of the provision is simplifying the procedure that 






197  Massima del Comitato Interregionale dei Consigli Notarili delle Tre Venezie I.I. 10, “Diritti particolari e alienazione della 
partecipazione”. 
198 Massima del Consiglio Notarile di Milano n. 171, “Nozione di categorie di quote di s.r.l. PMI”. 
199 CAPELLI. L'equity based crowdfunding e la c.d. "dematerializzazione" delle quote di s.r.l., Osservatorio del diritto civile e 
commerciale, Fasc. 2, 2016, p. 543. 
200 CIAN. L’intestazione intermediata delle quote di s.r.l. PMI: rapporto societario, regime della circolazione, Le Nuove Leggi 
Civili Commentate, Vol. 41, Fasc. 5, 2018, p. 1261.  
57 
 
It is important underlying that the issuer has not the duty of giving the mentioned possibility to 
the investors; indeed, it is only an option with respect to what established by the Civil Code, 
Article 2470. If such possibility is granted, there shall be also an expressed and clear indication 
on the crowdfunding platform, according to Subsection 2-ter of Article 100-ter of the TUF201.  
 
At the same time, granting this possibility does not oblige investors to adhere to the alternative 
circulation system. If they waived to it, there would be applied, in terms of share circulation, 
the provisions included in Article 2470 of the Civil Code (“direct registration”). On the other 
hand, when the option is exercised by the investors, the intermediary shall submit to the 
Business Registrar a certification attesting the ownership of the shares on behalf of third parties 
(“intermediary registration”); furthermore, the certification shall be submitted within 30 days 
from the end of the raising-capital offering202. A specific procedure in terms of shares’ transfers 
(that will be illustrated in the next paragraphs) will be followed by the intermediary from now 
on.  
 
The choice of adhering to the intermediary registration is not irreversible: indeed, the member 
that exercised the option has the possibility to request in any moment the return to the “direct 
registration” system (TUF, Article 100-ter, Subsection 2-bis, b), 4). On the other hand, it shall 
be considered as denied the possibility to apply for the alternative circulation rules with regards 
to shares already issued and subject to the ordinary “direct registration”203.  
 
Lastly, the abrogation of Subsection 2-quinquies of Article 100-ter of the TUF after Decreto 
Legislativo 129/2017 implies that the “intermediary registration” became a solution that 








201 CAPELLI. L'equity based crowdfunding e la c.d. "dematerializzazione" delle quote di s.r.l., Osservatorio del diritto civile e 
commerciale, Fasc. 2, 2016, p. 544. 
202 CAPELLI. L'equity based crowdfunding e la c.d. "dematerializzazione" delle quote di s.r.l., Osservatorio del diritto civile e 
commerciale, Fasc. 2, 2016, p. 544. 
203 CIAN. L’intestazione intermediata delle quote di s.r.l. PMI: rapporto societario, regime della circolazione, Le Nuove Leggi 
Civili Commentate, Vol. 41, Fasc. 5, 2018, p. 1261. 
204 CIAN. L’intestazione intermediata delle quote di s.r.l. PMI: rapporto societario, regime della circolazione, Le Nuove Leggi 
Civili Commentate, Vol. 41, Fasc. 5, 2018, p. 1279. 
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2.1 Transfer procedures   
 
 
As mentioned before, the most innovative element of the modification of Article 100-ter TUF 
concerns the new additional membership shares transfer mechanism, the “intermediary 
registration”. The new provision, included in Subsection 2-bis, simplifies the procedure since 
removes the requirement of the notarial deed in order to make the transfer effective; indeed, it 
would be sufficient a simple annotation of the transfer on a special registrar kept by the 
intermediary (Subsection 2-bis, c). Again, the procedure does not require official acts 
subscribed by notaries: it implies that, according to the intermediary registration, investors 
could get liquidity from crowdfunding investments more quickly and profitably205. Moreover, 
adhering to the alternative circulation system does not compromise their possibility to get fiscal 
benefits related to investments in innovative start-ups and SMEs206.  
 
Therefore, when investors are going to purchase the shares on the crowdfunding platforms have 
the possibility to adhere to the new transfer mechanism (if granted by the issuer). If the option 
is exercised by several crowdfunders, only one figure will be signed up on the Business 
Registrar, the intermediary itself207. In other words, the formal owner of the shares (as disclosed 
by the Business Registrar) will be the latter, while the former will become substantial owners 
of the shares purchased on the platform. When substantial owners decide to transfer their shares 
to new investors, they have simply to communicate the decision to the intermediary208, which 
will take note of the transaction on its special registrar209. However, nothing will change on the 
Business Registrar: the intermediary will maintain its position as if no transactions occur. 
Therefore, even if substantial owners change, the formal owner will remain the same, regardless 
of the transactions occurred among the members. Furthermore, the transaction will not charge 




205 CAPELLI. L'equity based crowdfunding e la c.d. "dematerializzazione" delle quote di s.r.l., Osservatorio del diritto civile e 
commerciale, Fasc. 2, 2016, p. 547; CIAN. L’intestazione intermediata delle quote di s.r.l. PMI: rapporto societario, regime 
della circolazione, Le Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate, Vol. 41, Fasc. 5, 2018, p. 1261. 
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Civili Commentate, Vol. 41, Fasc. 5, 2018, p. 1260. 
208 TUF, Art. 100-ter, Subsection 2-bis, b), 3.   
209 TUF, Art. 100-ter, Subsection 2-bis, c).  
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Moreover, it was observed that this transfer mechanism could be applied only with regards to 
inter vivos acts, since the provision is addressed only to subsequent alienations. Consequently, 
mortis causa transfers shall be realized according to the rules established by Article 2470 of the 
Civil Code211.  
 
 
2.2 Two sources of information  
 
 
Therefore, there will be two sources (and not only one) which provide information related to 
the enterprises’ corporate structure: the special registrar kept by the intermediary and the 
Business Registrar. The main function of the former is collecting all the transfers occurred 
among the members which adhered to the intermediary registration. However, it was observed 
that the special registrar has also a secondary purpose: indeed, as mentioned before, only the 
intermediaries will appear on the Business Registrar as formal owners of the shares. Therefore, 
the presence of a registrar that includes all the substantial owners’ names reduces the risk that 
intermediaries could “self-legitimizing” against the company in the exercise of the social rights 
associated with the shares of which they are officially formal owners212. 
 
According to the common law, the information related to the ownership changes of an 
enterprise shall be included in the Business Registrar213. However, if substantial owners 
decided to adhere to the new transfer mechanism, that source would become uninformative 
about the real corporate structure. In other words, the Business Registrar would have only a 
marginal role in signaling eventual company shares’ transfers214: indeed, only the special 
registrar held by the intermediary will keep track of all the effective dynamics related to the 
share circulation. The presence of two different sources of information raises the risk that the 
issuer could not be properly informed about the share transfers occurred among the members. 
As observed by the doctrine, forcing intermediaries to communicate the information kept in the 
special registrar to everyone who could get access to the Business Registrar seems not 
reasonable215.  
 
211 CAPELLI. L'equity based crowdfunding e la c.d. "dematerializzazione" delle quote di s.r.l., Osservatorio del diritto civile e 
commerciale, Fasc. 2, 2016, p. 544. 
212 CIAN. L’intestazione intermediata delle quote di s.r.l. PMI: rapporto societario, regime della circolazione, Le Nuove Leggi 
Civili Commentate, Vol. 41, Fasc. 5, 2018, p. 1265. 
213 Article 2470 of the Civil Code.  
214 CAPELLI. L'equity based crowdfunding e la c.d. "dematerializzazione" delle quote di s.r.l., Osservatorio del diritto civile e 
commerciale, Fasc. 2, 2016, p. 544. 
215 CIAN. L’intestazione intermediata delle quote di s.r.l. PMI: rapporto societario, regime della circolazione, Le Nuove Leggi 
Civili Commentate, Vol. 41, Fasc. 5, 2018, pp. 1271-1272.  
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Nevertheless, according to other authors, intermediaries cannot deny the necessary information 
to identify the substantial owners to everyone who could consult the Business Registrar (such 
as shareholders’ creditors) in order to get insights about the corporate structure of the firm216.  
 
Lastly, Article 2470 of the Civil Code states that membership shares’ transfers of an ordinary 
s.r.l. company become effective towards the enterprise when the requirement of the notarial 
deed is satisfied. The introduction of the intermediary registration overtakes this last 
requirement: indeed, a transfer becomes effective when the intermediary records the transaction 
on its special registrar (TUF, Article 100-ter, Subsection 2-bis, c)217. 
 
 
2.3 Exercise of the social rights 
 
 
Intermediary registration has also relevant implications related to the exercise of the social 
rights attached to the shares. Indeed, the formal ownership of the intermediary does not 
determine neither the shift of the rights from the investors towards him nor the possibility of 
the former to exercise the rights on behalf of the funders. Therefore, the role of the intermediary 
is strictly regulated by the Law, which states that the former cannot neither invest/divest in 
securities, nor exercise the social rights associated to the shares218. Those rights could be 
exercised only by the members recorded on the special registrar kept by the intermediary; 
furthermore, the latter has to provide to the substantial owners a certification which 
demonstrates their ownership and that legitimates them to exercise the rights attached (TUF 
Article 100-ter, comma 2 bis, b), 2).  
As a consequence, the exercise of the social rights will be attributed to a different subject 
compared to that recorded on the Business Registrar: the assertion confirms the split between 
formal and substantial ownership of the shares. Moreover, even if the substantial owner did not 
request the certification, the intermediary would not have in any case the possibility to exercise 
the social rights attached to the shares219.   
 
216 DE LUCA.  Crowdfunding e quote 'dematerializzate' di s.r.l.? prime considerazioni (art. 100 ter, commi 2. Quinquies, Le 
Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate, Vol. 39, Fasc. 1, 2016, p. 5. 
217 CIAN. L’intestazione intermediata delle quote di s.r.l. PMI: rapporto societario, regime della circolazione, Le Nuove Leggi 
Civili Commentate, Vol. 41, Fasc. 5, 2018, p. 1273. 
218 CAPELLI. L'equity based crowdfunding e la c.d. "dematerializzazione" delle quote di s.r.l., Osservatorio del diritto civile e 
commerciale, Fasc. 2, 2016, p. 545. 
219 CAPELLI. L'equity based crowdfunding e la c.d. "dematerializzazione" delle quote di s.r.l., Osservatorio del diritto civile e 
commerciale, Fasc. 2, 2016, p. 546. 
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The transfer of the certification cannot be considered as a valid instrument for the share 
circulation, since the TUF itself underlies that the document cannot be transferred, even on 
temporary basis, to third parties (TUF, Article 100-ter, comma 2 bis, b), 2). Therefore, the 
prohibition seems inhibiting also the possibility of the investors to mandate third parties for the 
exercise of the social rights. Again, even if investors do not request the certification to the 
intermediary, the latter will not be legitimated in the exercise of the voting rights associated 
with the shares: indeed, it seems lacking a provision similar to what established by Article 83-
novies (Subsection 1, a) of the TUF, which allows the intermediary to exercise the social rights 
on behalf of the substantial owners, if delegated by them220. As a consequence, in this last case 
both administrative rights and economic rights could be jointly managed by the intermediary221. 
Nevertheless, it was observed by a scholar that the member could still request to the 
intermediary a specific certification, which allows the third party to operate in a single specific 
situation on behalf of the substantial owners222.  
As mentioned before, social rights could be exercised only by substantial owners that own the 
certification provided by the intermediary according to what established by the TUF (Article 
100-ter, Subsection 2 bis, b), 2): as a consequence, it was observed that the intermediary 
registration cannot be included among the traditional fiduciary registration schemes223.  
 
On the other hand, other authors associate the alternative circulation system to the fiduciary 
registration, even if confirming that the rights cannot be exercised by third parties224. In 
particular, according to this interpretation, members and intermediary will enter in a 
relationship of trust, under which the latter will have the formal ownership of the shares and 








220 CAPELLI. L'equity based crowdfunding e la c.d. "dematerializzazione" delle quote di s.r.l., Osservatorio del diritto civile e 
commerciale, Fasc. 2, 2016, p. 546. 
221 CIAN. L’intestazione intermediata delle quote di s.r.l. PMI: rapporto societario, regime della circolazione, Le Nuove Leggi 
Civili Commentate, Vol. 41, Fasc. 5, 2018, p. 1267. 
222 DE LUCA.  Crowdfunding e quote 'dematerializzate' di s.r.l.? prime considerazioni (art. 100 ter, commi 2. Quinquies, Le 
Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate, Vol. 39, Fasc. 1, 2016, p. 7. 
223 CIAN. L’intestazione intermediata delle quote di s.r.l. PMI: rapporto societario, regime della circolazione, Le Nuove Leggi 
Civili Commentate, Vol. 41, Fasc. 5, 2018, p. 1264.  
224 CAPELLI. L'equity based crowdfunding e la c.d. "dematerializzazione" delle quote di s.r.l., Osservatorio del diritto civile e 
commerciale, Fasc. 2, 2016, p. 545. 
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3. Directa SIM, the most relevant Italian intermediary 
 
 
As mentioned before, Italian crowdfunding platforms could grant to potential investors a 
different system of share circulation, the intermediary registration. Moreover, the platform 
shall clearly indicate on its website the procedure that shall be followed by the crowdfunder in 
order to exercise the option and adhere to it (TUF, Article 100-ter, Subsection 2-ter). Regarding 
the procedure, crowdfunding platforms often explicitly indicate the intermediary that will be in 
charge of the role: one of the most important entity that offers this kind of service is Directa 
SIM, that over the last 2 years stipulated conventions with most of Italian crowdfunding 
platforms. In particular, 200Crowd, LifeSeeder, Walliance, Ecomill, WeAreStarting, 
Crowdfundme and Opstart.  
 
In order to adhere to the intermediary registration, those platforms require the opening of an 
account on Directa SIM, following a procedure explained step by step on the website of the 
latter. Investors will sustain those costs: 
 
a) a lump sum fee of €15, that will be paid when they are going to open the Directa SIM 
account. Those expenses shall finance the compliance procedure that the intermediary 
will follow for the customer identification, according to what required by the anti 
money-laundering regulation; 
b) a €20 fee, that will be paid by investors every time they decide to adhere to the 
intermediary registration with regards to shares purchased on affiliated crowdfunding 
platforms; 
c) a 5€ fee, that will be paid every time investors need the certification required to be 
legitimated in the exercise of the social rights attached225.  
 
Therefore, the overall costs of the procedure are significantly lower compared to the notarial 
expenses that shall be paid according to the common law rules in terms of share circulation. 
Moreover, considering the relatively low amount invested by the small crowdfunder, it could 
be inferred that, before the introduction of the intermediary registration, the only plausible and 





The latter are the most probable exit strategies since the issuers have the duty of including 
withdrawals’ and tag-along rights in the corporate bylaws226. However, investing in those 
instruments exposes crowdfunders to the risk of waiting several years before successfully and 
profitably exiting from the investment made. Alternative exit strategies, such as private 
transactions, were unlikely in such context before the intervention of the Legislator because of 
the high notarial commissions. Indeed, given the relatively low amount invested by the small 
crowdfunder, profits potentially gained from the investment could not be sufficient to cover the 
commissions required to transfer the shares to potential acquirers. Here is the ratio of the 
Legislator intervention: avoiding that the costs that shall be sustained by investors to realize 
private transactions would discourage equity crowdfunding platforms investments227. In order 
to achieve this purpose, the Legislator decided to introduce a derogation from the Civil Code 
rules related to the share transfer228.  
 
Intermediary registration represents a set of provisions that simplifies and makes less expensive 
the share transfer procedure. The new regulation is coherent with the objective of the Legislator 
of arranging a set of preferential rules aimed at making simpler and cheaper the establishment 
and the development of young enterprises. Therefore, the purpose of the intermediary 
registration is promoting frequent shares’ transfers among small investors, reducing associated 
fees and commissions. Lastly, the Legislator was pushed towards the introduction of such 
provisions also by the Advisory Board of Assolombarda: indeed, the firm association proposed 
to the Legislator itself a share subscription and transfer system directly managed by the 
intermediaries of the Chamber of Commerce, without any commission or fiscal burden charged 
on the investors229.   
 
The first cases of shares managed by Directa SIM according to the intermediary registration 
occurred at the beginning of 2019. However, only at the end of the same year, two investors put 
in place for the first time a transaction of s.r.l. shares without the drafting of a formal act by a 
notary230.  
 
226 DE LUCA.  Crowdfunding e quote 'dematerializzate' di s.r.l.? prime considerazioni (art. 100 ter, commi 2. Quinquies, Le 
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In particular, those minority shares (worth approximately €1000) were issued on the equity 
crowdfunding platform “WeAreStarting”. The funder, which had decided to adhere to the 
intermediary registration, sold those shares to the new member realizing a 40% gross capital 
gain. No notarial commissions were paid neither by the seller nor by the buyer: in this case, the 
former paid only an income tax equal to 26%.  
 
 
4. A step towards the secondary market 
 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the high degree of illiquidity related to equity 
crowdfunding investments depends on both the intrinsic difficulty in finding a potential buyer 
(problem i) and the complexity of the transfer procedures according to the common law 
(problem ii).  
 
Again, the intermediary registration simplifies and reduces the costs related to the transfer 
procedure of the s.r.l. shares issued on the equity crowdfunding platforms: as a consequence, 
those rules have an impact on the problem ii). Nevertheless they do not solve the problem i): 
indeed, even if the transfer procedure becomes simpler and cheaper, investors could still have 
problems and difficulties in finding potential buyers.  
 
In other words, the intermediary registration does not eliminate the illiquidity feature of the 
equity crowdfunding investments. Indeed, taking into consideration only those provisions, the 
possibility of exiting from the investments depends only on the ability of crowdfunders to find 
autonomously and through private negotiations new potential buyers231. Performing this kind 
of operations could be difficult and expensive, especially for small investors. As a consequence, 
the most feasible exit strategy regards the exercise of either tag-along or withdrawals’ rights.  
 
Nevertheless, even if the intermediary registration taken alone does not solve all the problems 
related to the illiquidity of the crowdfunding investments, it represents a first important step 
aimed at reducing it. Indeed, the provisions included in Article 100-ter of the TUF represent an 
element that lays the foundations for the creation of a secondary market where crowdfunders 
 
231 DE LUCA.  Crowdfunding e quote 'dematerializzate' di s.r.l.? prime considerazioni (art. 100 ter, commi 2. Quinquies, Le 
Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate, Vol. 39, Fasc. 1, 2016, p. 2.  
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of s.r.l. companies could quickly and efficiently exchange shares among each other232: the idea 
of secondary market for s.r.l. shares is interesting and it could lead to a significant acceleration 
of the Italian equity crowdfunding market233.  Therefore, assuming that the aim of the Legislator 
is encouraging crowdfunding investments, the most natural and complementary element of the 
intermediary registration is represented by the introduction of a secondary market. In such a 
market, investors could find more easily potential counterparties; on the other hand, the 
intermediary registration simplifies the transfer procedures among them. Indeed, in order to 
successfully complete the transaction, it will be necessary only a communication to the 
intermediary, which will record the transaction on its special registrar. As mentioned before, 
only substantial owners will change: the formal owner (the intermediary) will remain the same 
after the occurrence of the transaction.  
 
The development of a secondary market could make crowdfunding securities even more 
attractive for potential investors234. Indeed, apart from the opportunity of diversifying their 
overall investment portfolio, crowdfunders could acquire the possibility to more easily divest 
from the securities acquired, rather than waiting for future and uncertain IPOs or Takeovers.  
 
Lastly, more than reducing transfer costs (the Legislator intervened in this sense introducing 
the intermediary registration), the creation of a secondary market could give the possibility to 
potential buyers to better collect updated and complete information in order to decide whether 
investing in some crowdfunding securities or not235.  
 
 
5. The Italian prototype of secondary market: “Bacheche elettroniche” 
 
 
In order to facilitate shares’ transfers among current and potential investors, uncertainties arise 
about the real possibility of creating specific secondary markets for crowdfunding securities. 
The introduction of such markets could represent an interesting solution for the problem i) 
mentioned before, since it will allow investors to easily find potential counterparties.  
 
232 CAPELLI. L'equity based crowdfunding e la c.d. "dematerializzazione" delle quote di s.r.l., Osservatorio del diritto civile e 
commerciale, Fasc. 2, 2016, pp. 562-563; CIAN. L’intestazione intermediata delle quote di s.r.l. PMI: rapporto societario, 
regime della circolazione, Le Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate, Vol. 41, Fasc. 5, 2018, p. 1261. 
233https://www.crowdfundme.it/blog/riepilogo-settimanale/la-prima-campagna-di-equity-crowdfunding-in-italia-con-il-
servizio-di-rubricazione-quote-la-settimana-di-crowdfundme-432018/ 
234 CIAN. L’intestazione intermediata delle quote di s.r.l. PMI: rapporto societario, regime della circolazione, Le Nuove Leggi 
Civili Commentate, Vol. 41, Fasc. 5, 2018, p. 1261. 
235 CAPELLI. L'equity based crowdfunding e la c.d. "dematerializzazione" delle quote di s.r.l., Osservatorio del diritto civile e 
commerciale, Fasc. 2, 2016, p. 565. 
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As previously stated, the Legislator decided to allow most of Italian SMEs, mainly established 
as s.r.l., to issue their shares on equity crowdfunding platforms, providing them an alternative 
source of capital. Regarding the possibility to create a secondary market, Article 100-ter of the 
TUF (Subsection 1-bis) states that the shares could be offered also through raising-capital 
platforms: the word “also” was interpreted in the scholarship as the possibility that the entities 
which manage the platform have in arranging on their websites a section devoted to the 
negotiation of the shares already issued on the platform itself236. The conclusion comes from 
the interpretation according to which the shares issued by s.r.l. companies shall be included 
inside the notion of “financial instruments” and in particular inside the sub-category of 
“securities”. This notion shall be attributed also to those s.r.l. shares since they are going to be 
quoted on a kind of capital market, the equity crowdfunding platform237. As a consequence, 
those “securities” could be subject both to public and financial circulation238.  
 
The interpretation comes from what reported in the TUF, Article 100-ter; however, other 
authors argued that the definition proposed by the Legislator (“financial instrument”) shall be 
considered as inaccurate239. In particular, both Article 2468 of the Civil Code and Article 26 of 
D.L. 179/2012 adopt the notion “financial product”. Since this kind of investments have a 
financial nature, shares issued on crowdfunding platforms are compliant with this definition. 
The inclusion inside the notion of “securities” or “financial instruments” was judged more 
controversial: s.r.l. shares shall not be included nor in the former, since they are not stocks or 
equivalent instruments, neither in the latter, since their characteristics are not in line with any 
of the categories illustrated in the TUF itself (Article 1, Subsection 2). 
 
In terms of creation of a secondary market, the Legislator modified the CONSOB Regulation 
n. 18592 of 2013 introducing the concept of “Bacheche elettroniche”240. The modification was 
approved on 10Th October 2019 after a public consultation held between June e July of the same 
year.  
 
236 SANTORO. Tentativi di sviluppo di un mercato secondario delle quote di società a responsabilità limitata, in La società a 
responsabilità limitata: un modello transtipico alla prova del Codice della Crisi, 2020, p. 283. The author states that the 
“platform” shall be interpreted not only as a mean through which issuing securities, but also as a place that shall allow the 
subsequent circulation of the shares issued. 
237 BENAZZO. Categorie di quote, diritti di voto e governance della 'nuovissima' s.r.l., Rivista delle Società, Fasc. 5/6, 2018, 
p. 1454. 
238 BENAZZO. Categorie di quote, diritti di voto e governance della 'nuovissima' s.r.l., Rivista delle Società, Fasc. 5/6, 2018, 
p. 1454.  
239 GUACCERO. La start-up innovativa in forma di società a responsabilità limitata: raccolta di capitale di rischio ed equity 
crowdfunding, Banca borsa e titoli di credito, Vol. 67, Fasc. 6, 2014, pp. 714-715. 
240 Delibera n. 21110 of 10.10.2019, Modifiche al Regolamento Consob n. 18592 del 26 giugno 2013 sulla raccolta di capitali 
di rischio tramite portali on-line e successive modifiche e integrazioni (Regolamento Crowdfunding). 
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In particular, according to the new Regulation, portal managers could arrange in a separate 
section of the website a “virtual showcase” that has the purpose of gathering all the expressions 
of interests for the shares already issued on the platform itself (TUF, Article 25-bis, Subsection 
1). It is important underlying that portal managers shall not execute any activity aimed at 
directly facilitating the transaction between the two counterparties (TUF, Article 25-bis, 
Subsection 2)241. 
 
Concerning the structure of the offering, it could be associated to a public “sale announcement” 
with a predetermined and standard content: indeed, potential sellers could indicate in the 
announcement only information related to the shares (in terms of types of rights attached, for 
example) and to their contact details, so that potential acquirers could get in touch with them in 
order to start the private transaction. On the other hand, also “purchase announcements” could 
be placed on the “Bacheca elettronica”: in this case, potential buyers will indicate on the 
website the characteristics of the shares that they are willing to purchase. Therefore, the 
intervention of the Legislator does not allow the realization of an instantaneous transfer, but it 
indirectly facilitates the inception of the private transaction between the two counterparties: 
again, it does not allow transactions such those performed on regulated stock exchange markets.  
 
The first Italian crowdfunding platform that introduced a “Bacheca Elettronica” on its website 
was Opstart, which named it “Crowdarena”: it represents, in compliance to the new regulation, 
a separate section of the crowdfunding platform that encourages private transactions concerning 
only the shares already issued on that portal. Moreover, sale and purchase offerings posted on 
it shall not be considered neither as “public announcements” from a juridical point of view (as 
established by the Article 1336 of the Civil Code) nor as “sale promises” (regulated by Article 




241 Subsection added after Delibera n. 21110 of 10.10.2019, Modifiche al Regolamento Consob n. 18592 del 26 giugno 2013 























5.1 Seedrs Secondary Market and differences with the Italian regulation  
 
 
Summarising, the recent interventions of the Legislator have the purpose of supporting the 
growth of the Italian crowdfunding market, reducing the illiquidity risk of those kind of 
investments. Furthermore, both the intermediary registration and the development of a 
prototype of secondary market seem going towards a different idea of equity crowdfunding 
platform. The portal that shall be taken as a point of reference is the British Seedrs, which 
proposes to their crowdfunders similar options compared to those acknowledged by the Italian 
Legislator. Indeed, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the British platform offers the 
possibility to adhere to its “Nominee Structure” system; moreover, Seedrs has developed in 
2017 a kind of secondary market which allows the circulation of the shares that are detained 
according to the trustee structure developed. Those shares have a unique formal owner, Seedrs 
itself, which is in charge of taking care of all the changes in the substantial ownerships.  
 
Therefore, several analogies seem to arise when comparing the regulatory approach of the 
Italian Legislator and the features of one of the most important crowdfunding platform in the 
world. It is true that both models are characterized by the presence of a single formal owner on 
behalf of the substantial owners that purchased the shares on the platform. However, relevant 
dissimilarities have to be carefully taken into consideration: indeed, according to the Italian 
“intermediary registration”, when investors are going to transfer the shares to their 
counterparties, they have to communicate the decision to the intermediary; the transaction 
becomes effective towards the enterprise when the latter records on its special registrar the 
change in the substantial ownership. On the contrary, the transfer mechanism applied by Seedrs 
will require the execution of a formal Transfer of Beneficial Ownership243, after which the price 
is going to be paid and the new substantial ownership will be recorded according to the Seedrs’ 
Nominee Structure. Therefore, the procedure recently introduced by the Italian Legislator 
makes the share transfer quicker and more straightforward.  
Another important difference concerns the role played by the intermediaries: the Italian 
Legislator attributes them only a formal role, which simply consists in recording the transfers 
occurred among the members that adhered to the “intermediary registration”.  
 
243 The Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations, Part 5, 
Beneficial Ownership Information, 2017.  
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On the contrary, according to the Nominee Structure, the intermediary (Seedrs itself) will 
exercise the social rights eventually attached to the shares on behalf of the investors that 
purchased them. As observed by some scholars, the development of a corporate structure in 
which voting rights are exercised by competent and experienced intermediaries is correlated 
with better financial performances of the enterprises that resort to it244. However, differently 
from the British platform, the Italian intermediary cannot exercise any social right in the 
interests of the substantial owners; indeed, the former shall issue a specific certification in order 
to legitimate the latter towards the enterprise in the exercise of those rights.  
 
Lastly, some similarities exist with regards to the structure of the secondary market. Concerning 
Seedrs Secondary Market, “in no circumstances [the British platform] will execute a trade 
automatically following a request to buy or to sell”245; therefore, the Market developed by 
Seedrs does not represent a “Multilateral Trade Facilities” as defined by the MIFID 
Regulation246. The Italian “Bacheca Elettronica” follows similar principles, since it does not 
allow instantaneous trades but, on the contrary, it permits potential counterparties to easily get 








244 WALTHOFF-BORM, VANACKER, COLLEWAERT. Equity Crowdfunding, Shareholder Structures, and Firm 
Performance, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 26, Issue 5, 2018, p. 325. 
245 www.seedrs.com/pages/secondary-market-terms 









6. Possible future interventions of the Italian Legislator  
 
 
The path undertaken by the Italian Legislator seems following the line traced by one of the most 
developed equity crowdfunding market in the world, the British one. Italy is in strong delay 
compared to the British equity crowdfunding market. Data are unequivocal: in 2018 UK shows 
an overall equity crowdfunding volume of £271.3 million247, while in Italy the capital raised 
through online platforms was equal to €36.39 million248. Another important element is related 
to the dimension of the secondary market, just designed in Italy and already well-developed in 
UK. However, retracing the features of the well-known British platform could represent an 
interesting point; in this case, the purpose of the Italian Legislator would be encouraging the 
growth of a market still less developed and increasing the investment propensity towards those 
kind of instruments.  
 
Currently, investments on crowdfunding platforms could be interpreted as a risky but 
interesting diversification opportunity if compared to “classic” financial investments, such as 
quoted stocks or bonds. Besides the technical and the juridical characteristics of the instruments 
(and the expectations in terms of risk and return) there is another important difference between 




248 OSSERVATORI ENTREPRENEURSHIP & FINANCE. 5° Report italiano sul CrowdInvesting, Politecnico di Milano, 
School of Management, 2020, p. 22.   
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Among the 269 equity crowdfunding offerings successfully completed in Italy from 2019 to the 
beginning of 2020, it emerged that natural persons realized 18.021 purchases overall. The 
number of backers, 10.668, is clearly lower compared to the total purchases performed, since a 
natural person could have realized more than a single capital subscription. Nevertheless, most 
of natural persons (77,63%) invested only in a single issuer249.  Generally, when households 
take the decision of investing their savings on financial markets, they decide to entrust their 
money to an experienced advisor, which will invest in certain instruments according to their 
risk preferences. Therefore, the money will be managed by an intermediary which often 
requires a fee or a percentage on the profits achieved in exchange for the services offered; lastly, 
households usually will not have any active role in the investment dynamic.  
 
Equity crowdfunding investments are based on a different logic: here, crowdfunders directly 
choose the firm in which investing. During the investment process, they will autonomously 
analyse all the available information about the issuers before investing into them. Then, after 
comparing different ideas and entrepreneurs among each other, they will purchase the shares of 
the preferred company on the platform. However, this is only half of the story. Indeed, after 
that the purchase is completed, crowdfunders need to actively take care of the investment made: 
as a consequence, they will have to exercise also the social rights, if attached to the shares 
themselves. The introduction of the “intermediary registration” by the Italian Legislator 
simplified the shares’ transfer procedures and aimed at nurturing the development of a platform 
model characterized by a higher degree of intermediation. The next step could be that of 
intermediating not only the share circulation, but also the exercise of the social rights (in 
particular the voting rights), in line to what already granted by the British platform Seedrs. At 
the moment, the possibility is explicitly excluded by the Italian Legislator.   
 
In Italy, considering the sample of the equity crowdfunding offerings arranged last year, it 
emerged that 83% of the shares issued had voting rights attached250. In particular, 11% consists 
in ordinary shares, while the remaining percentage concerns shares which attribute or not voting 
rights to the funders on the basis of the capital amount that they are going to invest. As 
mentioned before, the issuer arranges a certain investment threshold: if overtaken, investors 
will get class A shares; if the investment amount is lower, they will get class B shares, usually 
without voting rights attached. 
 
249 OSSERVATORI ENTREPRENEURSHIP & FINANCE. 5° Report italiano sul CrowdInvesting, Politecnico di Milano, 
School of Management, 2020, p. 35. 
250 OSSERVATORI ENTREPRENEURSHIP & FINANCE. 5° Report italiano sul CrowdInvesting, Politecnico di Milano, 
School of Management, 2020, p. 21. 
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The average amount invested by Italian crowdfunders is equal to €3.222251; however, more than 
a half of the sample (54,7%) invested an amount lower than €1.000252. Italian statistics do not 
exist yet but, with regards to the British equity crowdfunding campaigns, studies showed that 
the average threshold applied by an issuer is £9.000253. Assuming that the data are reliable, on 
average the small Italian crowdfunder will not get shares with voting rights attached after its 
crowdfunding investment. As a consequence, introducing a rule stating that the voting rights 
are going to be exercised by an experienced intermediary will have only a marginal impact on 
the small crowdfunder position.  
 
However, as mentioned before, the application of a high threshold for the voting rights delivery 
leads to a more significant separation between control and ownership, which in turn negatively 
influences the probability of success of the crowdfunding offerings and the possibility to easily 
proceed with further financing rounds254. 
 
As a consequence, an eventual intervention of the Italian Legislator aimed at increasing the 
degree of intermediation shall be implemented together with a policy which incentives the 
application of lower thresholds for the voting rights delivery. The bundle of policies could 
produce negative consequences from the entrepreneur-side: in particular, lowering the 
thresholds in a context in which most of voting rights delivered to small investors are pooled 
into the hands of a single formal owner could weaken the position of the founders. Indeed, the 
percentage of voting rights detained by the latter will decrease, ceteris paribus. However, it is 
important underlying that the average capital share offered on Italian crowdfunding platforms 
was equal to 11,3% in 2020 (with a median value of 5,1%)255. Therefore, even if the 
increasingly degree of intermediation seems weakening their position, the real impact on the 
entrepreneur-side could be considered as marginal. The founders will maintain the control of 




251 Data referred only to natural persons.  
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253 CUMMING, MEOLI, VISMARA. Investors’ choices between cash and voting rights: Evidence from dual-class equity 
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254 CUMMING, MEOLI, VISMARA. Investors’ choices between cash and voting rights: Evidence from dual-class equity 
crowdfunding, Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(8), 2019, p. 14. 
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Therefore, the eventual promulgation of such provisions will not revolutionize the decision-
making process; however, the entrance in the corporate structure of a formal owner which 
operates on behalf of small investors that purchased the shares on the platform could have 
several positive results. First of all, there will be a reduction in the risk of taking decisions 
which could unfairly damage the position of small investors. Indeed, the latter will be 
represented in the assembly by experienced intermediaries, able to understand the corporate 
dynamics and to intervene in their interest. Furthermore, a clear and transparent communication 
channel between investors and intermediaries and the building of a relationship of trust between 
them could incentive even more crowdfunding investments.   
 
 
7. Blockchain technology and share circulation 
 
 
With regards to the shares issued by enterprises which raise capital through crowdfunding 
platforms, the recent interventions of the Italian Legislator seem going towards an increasingly 
degree of intermediation: the introduction of an alternative system of share circulation 
represents the most important example of that.  
 
However, it is important assessing also a tendency which goes in the opposite direction 
compared to that illustrated across the previous chapters. The recent informatic developments 
of the Blockchain technology offer interesting sparks in terms of disintermediation and 
decentralization. Blockchain represents the most important example of Distributed Ledger 
Technology (DLT): the purpose is managing transactions through the creation of a database 
built on peer-to-peer systems257. The logic is significantly different compared to that of the 
traditional centralized information systems; however, Blockchain technology is still able to 
assure the reliability and the immutability of the data recorded258. 
 
The main application field of the technology is represented by the financial sector; nevertheless, 
it was observed an increasingly diffusion also on other industries, such as automotive, energetic 
and agri-food259.  
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In the business field, the development of Blockchain technologies has allowed the born of a 
new phenomenon, the Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs): they represent raising-capital mechanisms 
that clearly recall the well-known Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) adopted by the enterprises that 
are going to be quoted on regulated markets. ICOs could be interpreted as initiatives based on 
the Blockchain technology which share the same underlying logic, even if relevant differences 
remain. In particular, both consist in a kind of raising-capital process: however, differently from 
IPOs, investors in ICOs will not get any share of enterprises in exchange for their capital 
injections; instead, they are going to receive “tokens”. Tokens could be interpreted as 
instruments which are representative of the investments made and that could attribute to the 
owners different kind of rights: the latter could be related both to services or goods to be 
delivered in the future260 or to rights that could be exercised against the issuer261. Uncertainties 
arise about the possibility of considering tokens as potential substitutes of participating shares 
of s.r.l. companies. If allowed, there could follow several advantages in terms of transfer 
procedures: in particular, share circulation could take place on a more liquid secondary market 
compared to the traditional one262. 
 
Tokens could be classified into three main categories: currency, utility and investment tokens. 
Regarding the financial markets regulation, the latter shall be included within the category of 
“financial products”, since they are a financial investment from which the investor expects a 
certain economic return; furthermore, even if they could be included also within the sub-
category of “financial instruments” (Attachment 1, Section C TUF), CONSOB explicitly 
excludes this classification, stating that it shall be created a proper category263. Among the 
investment tokens, it is important focusing on the security tokens, which attribute to the owners 
economic and administrative rights against the issuer264.  
 
Those instruments, which are the most comparable category to the s.r.l. participating shares, 
are offered to the public through Security Token Offerings (STOs). They could represent a 
relevant technical breakthrough since the system was assessed as both safer and quicker in terms 
of circulation compared to the centralized ones265.  
 
260 MURINO. Il conferimento di token e di criptovalute nelle S.r.l., Le Società, Vol. 38, Fasc. 1, 2019, p. 35. 
261 DE LUCA. Documentazione crittografica e circolazione della ricchezza assente, Rivista di Diritto Civile, Vol. 66, Fasc.1, 
2020, p. 102. 
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As mentioned before, s.r.l. membership shares’ circulation shall be performed in compliance to 
what established by Article 2470 of the Civil Code. Therefore, it is required an official act 
subscribed by a notary in order to make effective the transaction. The only derogation consists 
in Article 100-ter of the TUF, according to which it could be sufficient an annotation on a 
special registrar kept by the intermediary if the member adhered to the intermediary 
registration. 
 
Some authors excluded the possibility of utilizing tokens as substitutes of s.r.l. shares after 
assessing both s.r.l. representation and circulation rules266. The vision does not change even 
after considering the high degree of freedom of the intermediaries about the holding of the 
special registrar mentioned in Article 100-ter of the TUF. It was supposed that such freedom 
could also result into a scenario in which intermediaries attribute to every substantial owner 
tokens representative of the participating shares acquired on the crowdfunding platform. In this 
scenario, a share transfer becomes effective when the token is transferred to the new acquirer. 
After the transfer of the token, according to this interpretation, the transaction would be 
recorded by the intermediary on its special registrar. However, even if technically possible, this 
kind of transfer was judged as unlawful267. 
 
On the contrary, as stated by different scholars, investments tokens could be representative of 
s.r.l. shares since the Italian Legislator permits both s.r.l. shares standardization and their 
transferability on secondary markets268. However, according to the international practice, even 
if tokens could be representative of economic and/or administrative rights, the owners do not 
become members of the company: indeed, their legal position can be equalized to that of 
associates in a “partnership agreement” (“contratto di associazione in partecipazione”, as 
established by Article 2549, Subsection 1, of the Civil Code) 269. 
 
Finally, doubts arise about the possibility that the intermediary (or another subjects, such as the 
issuer) could underwrite the shares issued on behalf of the purchasers, attributing them tokens 
representative of participating shares.  
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The idea is that those tokens could legitimate the owners in the exercise of the social rights and 
could be used to execute transfers. However, also this possibility shall be excluded, since the 
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Crowdfunding was defined by some scholars as an “open call, essentially through the Internet, 
for the provision of financial resources either in form of donation or in exchange for some form 
of reward and/or voting rights in order to support initiatives for specific purposes”. The 
definition provided highlights the existence of different types of fundraising processes, which 
differ according to what funders could get in exchange for their investment on online platforms. 
One of them is the equity-based crowdfunding, introduced in Italy through an organic 
regulatory framework (first case in Europe) after the emanation of D.L. 179/2012. The 
framework has undergone several significant changes during the last decade, among which: i) 
the extension of the potential beneficiaries to every SME established as s.r.l.; ii) a new share 
transfer system, the intermediary registration; iii) the arrangement of a prototype of secondary 
market, called “Bacheche Elettroniche”. Those interventions have the purpose of stimulating 
the Italian equity crowdfunding market.  
 
Moreover, it seems that the Italian Legislator is going to promote a crowdfunding platform 
model similar to that arranged by the British platform Seedrs. In particular, the Italian 
“Bachecha Elettronica” has significant structural analogies with the Secondary Market 
developed by the British platform. In addition, also the intermediary registration and the 
Seedrs’s Nominee Structure have some similarities, such as the presence of a single formal 
owner on behalf of a multitude of substantial owners. However, regarding the latter 
comparison, there is an important difference: the subject in charge of exercising the voting 
rights associated with the participating shares. Concerning the Italian regulation, those rights 
will be exercised by the substantial owners, which are legitimated by a specific certification 
issued by the intermediary; regarding the Nominee Structure, voting rights will be exercised by 
the platform itself on behalf of the substantial owners.  
 
Assuming Seedrs as the point of reference of the Italian Legislator, it could be that future 
interventions would go towards the legitimization of the intermediary in exercising those kind 
of rights. Such possibility, at the moment explicitly excluded by the Legislator, would be 





Indeed, pooled voting rights schemes (such as the Nominee Structure) seem performing better 
compared to the other models, since companies that resort to the former exhibit greater financial 
results in the years following the issuance.  
 
However, there is a further element that has to be assessed: when classes of shares with voting 
rights attached are going to be issued on equity crowdfunding platforms, it is often established 
a certain investment threshold. If the amount invested by the funders is higher compared to it, 
the shares purchased will have voting rights attached (class A shares); otherwise, those shares 
do not attribute to the owners such administrative rights (class B shares).  
 
Data show that the amount invested by small funders is on average lower compared to the 
investment threshold: therefore, even if provisions which allow intermediaries to exercise 
voting rights on their behalf were introduced, the impact would be only marginal. As a 
consequence, an eventual intervention of the Legislator in this sense shall be followed by a 
policy aimed at incentivizing the application of lower investment thresholds. In this regards, 
other academic studies confirm that the application of a high threshold for the voting rights 
delivery leads to a more significant separation between control and ownership; which in turn 
negatively influences the probability of success of the crowdfunding offering, the possibility to 
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NOTARIAL COUNCILS  
 
Massima del Consiglio Notarile di Milano n. 171, “Nozione di categorie di quote di s.r.l. PMI”. 
Massima del Consiglio Notarile di Milano n. 172, “Modalità e condizioni di emissione di 
categorie di quote di S.r.l. PMI”. 
Massima del Consiglio Notarile di Milano n. 173, “Contenuto dei diritti diversi delle categorie 
di quote di s.r.l. PMI”.  
Massima del Consiglio Notarile di Milano n. 174, “Categorie di quote a voto ridotto o 
maggiorato nelle s.r.l. PMI”. 
Massima del Consiglio Notarile di Milano n. 175, “Categorie di quote con diritto di opzione 
limitato o escluso nelle S.r.l. PMI”.  
Massima del Consiglio Notarile di Milano n. 176, “Categorie di quote con limitazione dei diritti 
di controllo nelle S.r.l. PMI”. 
Massima del Consiglio Notarile di Milano n. 177, “Assemblee speciali dei titolari di categorie 
di quote di s.r.l. PMI”. 
Massima del Consiglio Notarile di Milano n. 179, “Acquisto di quote proprie da parte di s.r.l. 
PMI”. 
Massima del Consiglio Notarile di Milano n. 189, “Clausole che pongono un «tetto massimo» 
al diritto agli utili (artt. 2247, 2265, 2350 e 2433 c.c.)”. 
Massima del Comitato Interregionale dei Consigli Notarili delle Tre Venezie I.N.1, 
“Definizione di s.r.l.-PMI”. 
Massima del Comitato Interregionale dei Consigli Notarili delle Tre Venezie I.N. 2, “I diversi 
diritti attribuibili alle categorie di quote nelle s.r.l.-PMI”.  
Massima del Comitato Interregionale dei Consigli Notarili delle Tre Venezie I.N. 3, “Assenza 
di limiti quantitativi nella creazione di categorie di quote a voto limitato nelle s.r.l.-PMI”. 
Massima del Comitato Interregionale dei Consigli Notarili delle Tre Venezie I.N. 4, “Perdita 
da parte di s.r.l. dei requisiti di PMI e sorte delle categorie di quote esistenti”. 
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Massima del Comitato Interregionale dei Consigli Notarili delle Tre Venezie I.N. 5, “Diritto di 
prelazione negli aumenti di capitale di s.r.l.-PMI in presenza di categorie di quote”. 
Massima del Comitato Interregionale dei Consigli Notarili delle Tre Venezie, I.N. 9, “Limiti 
all’ammissibilità del voto divergente nel caso di socio titolare di quote di diverse categorie”. 
Massima del Comitato Interregionale dei Consigli Notarili delle Tre Venezie, I.N. 10, 
“Legittimità delle clausole limitative della circolazione delle partecipazioni riferite a singole 
categorie di quote”. 
Massima del Comitato Interregionale dei Consigli Notarili delle Tre Venezie, I.N. 11, 
“Assemblee speciali in presenza di quote di categoria”. 
Massima del Comitato Interregionale dei Consigli Notarili delle Tre Venezie, I.N. 13, “Limiti 
all’acquisto di proprie partecipazioni”. 
Massima del Comitato Interregionale dei Consigli Notarili delle Tre Venezie I.I. 10, “Diritti 
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